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INTRODUCTION
In February 2012, more than 5700 individuals boycotted
a leading multinational corporation and successfully derailed
a legislative initiative that would have significantly
benefitted the industry.1
Who were the individuals
1. Thomas Lin, Mathematicians Organize Boycott of a Publisher, N.Y.
TIMES , February 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/science/
researchers-boycott-elsevier-journal-publisher.html?_r=0.
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responsible for this remarkable demonstration of grassroots
political muscle? Environmental activists? Opponents of
corporate globalization? Self-proclaimed representatives of
the ninety-nine percent? No, the group that successfully
stared down this multi-billion dollar global enterprise
consisted mostly of mathematicians and other natural
scientists.2 The focus of their boycott: Elsevier, the world’s
largest publisher of scientific journals.3
Led by some of the most prominent names in
mathematics, the protesters objected to Elsevier’s spiraling
prices and its push to abolish a policy whereby scientific
articles funded by the U.S. National Institutes of Health
(NIH) are made publicly available.4 The boycott pressured
Elsevier to withdraw its support for the bill, called the
Research Works Act, and ultimately led to its demise.5
Though the proposed Research Works Act was the immediate
cause of the Elsevier boycott, the uprising by scientists is
symptomatic of a much deeper and longer conflict within the
scientific community. As observed by Ingrid Daubechies,
president of the International Mathematical Union, the
boycott arose because the “social compact [between scientists
and publishers] is broken.”6
In the 1940s, sociologist Robert K. Merton famously
identified four fundamental norms that characterize both the
practice and culture of science.
Among these is the
willingness of scientists to share their discoveries and
findings freely.7 While the motivations that lead scientists to
share, as well as the practical difficulties inherent in this
activity, have been debated since Merton’s day, there is little
argument that the accessibility of scientific findings is critical
to the advancement of scientific progress.8 In addition, the
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Research Works Act, H.R. 3699, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced by
Representatives Issa and Maloney on December 16, 2011).
5. The bill’s co-sponsors withdrew it in February 2012. Jennifer Howard,
Legislation to Bar Public-Access Requirement on Federal Research is Dead,
CHRON. HIGHER ED., Feb. 27, 2012, http://chronicle.com/article/Legislation-toBar/130949/.
6. Lin, supra note 1.
7. ROBERT K. MERTON, The Normative Structure of Science (1942), in THE
S OCIOLOGY OF S CIENCE 267–78 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973).
8. Such acknowledgements abound in the literature. E.g., Scott Aaronson
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sharing of data enables scientists to validate and
independently verify the findings, analyses, and conclusions
of their colleagues.9 As a result, the sharing of scientific
But
information contributes to overall social welfare.10
despite the acknowledged importance of sharing scientific
information, the ability of scientists to access information
relevant to their fields has come under increasing pressure.
The most prominent means of disseminating results in
the sciences is, and has been for more than three centuries,
publication in peer-reviewed scientific journals.11 Prior to
et al., The Cost of Knowledge (2012), available at http://gowers.files.
wordpress.com/2012/02/elsevierstatementfinal.pdf
(statement of thirty-four
prominent mathematicians protesting the practices of Elsevier).
9. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ENSURING THE INTEGRITY, ACCESSIBILITY,
AND STEWARDSHIP OF RESEARCH DATA IN THE DIGITAL AGE 59 (2009) (“Only
when a researcher shares data and results with other researchers can the
accuracy of the data, analyses, and conclusions be verified.”); Paul David, The
Economic Logic of “Open Science” and the Balance between Private Property
Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer, in
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA
AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM 21
(2003) (“Disclosure . . . creates an expectation that all claims to have
contributed to the stock of reliable knowledge will be subjected to trials of
verification, without insult to the claimant.”).
10. For the sake of argument, I will assume that scientific discoveries, by
and large, are socially beneficial. I recognize but avoid the thorny debate over
the desirability and social utility of research in some controversial fields (e.g.,
human cloning, embryonic stem cells, biological warfare, genetic modification of
organisms, nuclear fission/fusion, cryogenics, and the like).
Moreover, I intentionally avoid the question of whether maintaining
discoveries as secret, as opposed to sharing them, can lead to greater
innovation, particularly in industrial settings. For a discussion of the role of
secrecy in innovation, see J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 917, 928–31 (2011). For purposes of this paper, I abide by the
generally-held assumption that scientific progress is more typically advanced by
disclosure, rather than concealment, of discoveries. And in any case, the
discoveries addressed in this paper are ones that scientists have intentionally
submitted for publication, evidencing their own preference for disclosure over
secrecy. Any subsequent limitations on access to these discoveries by journals
are imposed by the policies and financial considerations of journals rather than
scientists.
11. See MERTON, supra note 7, at 325, 337 (“From its very beginning, the
journal of science introduced the institutional device of quick publication to
motivate men of science to replace the value set upon secrecy with the value
placed upon the open disclosure of the knowledge they had created.” (footnote
omitted)); JOHN M. ZIMAN, PROMETHEUS BOUND: SCIENCE IN A DYNAMIC
STEADY STATE 39 (1994) (arguing that the peer-reviewed publication process is
“at the very core of academic science” and “inseparable from its other
functions”).
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World War II, scientific journals were published primarily by
learned societies organized and governed by members of the
scientific community.12 Today, what was once a cottage
industry is dominated by a handful of commercial publishers
that control a market valued at between $7 billion13 and $10
billion annually.14 The ascendancy of commercial publishers
in scientific publishing began in the late 1950s and has had
several notable effects.
First, the number of journals catering to specialized subdisciplines expanded rapidly. In 1960, it has been estimated
that roughly 2800 scientific journals were in print.15 Today,
estimates place the number somewhere between 16,00016 and
24,00017 journals.
Second, between 1975 and 1995, publishers significantly
increased subscription rates for scientific journals and began
to bundle titles into expensive packages offered to libraries at
a single hefty rate.18 Increases were at levels far in excess of
inflation and resulted in subscription rates significantly
above those of non-profit journals.19 As a result, the cost of
12. What is generally regarded as the first scientific journal, the
Philosophical Transactions, was launched by the British Royal Society in 1665.
Philosophical
Transactions—the
World's
First
Science
Journal,
PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS , http://rstl.royalsocietypublishing.org/ (last
visited Apr. 25, 2013). Today many journals, including the prestigious title
Science published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS), are still published by learned societies. About AAAS: What is AAAS?,
AAAS, http://www.aaas.org/aboutaaas/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).
13. EPS, Changing Business in Scientific, Technical and Medical Publishing
Marketplace 2 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/
32145392.pdf.
14. Scientific, Technical & Medical: Research Reports, MARKET
RESEARCH. COM ,
http://www.marketresearch.com/Technology-Media-c1599
/Media-c92/Scientific-Technical-Medical-c1661/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).
15. Carol Tenopir & Donald W. King, Toward Electronic Journals: Realities
for Scientists, Librarians, and Publishers, 11 PSYCOLOQUY 1, para. 7 (2000),
available at http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.084.
16. Access
All
Areas,
THE
ECONOMIST ,
Aug.
5,
2004,
http://www.economist.com/node/3061258.
17. Manon A. Ress, Open-Access Publishing: From Principles to Practice, in
ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 475, 477
(Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010).
18. EUROPEAN COMM ’ N, S TUDY ON THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL
EVOLUTION OF THE S CIENTIFIC PUBLICATION MARKETS IN E UROPE: FINAL
REPORT 23–24 (2006).
19. See Carl T. Bergstrom & Theodore C. Bergstrom, The Costs and Benefits
of Library Site Licenses to Academic Journals, 101 PROC. N AT ’L ACAD. S CI . 897
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subscribing to many journals, particularly those in
specialized technical fields,20 became prohibitive to all but the
largest institutions.
What followed was a widespread
reduction in subscription volume by academic libraries of all
sizes.21 Even Harvard University, arguably the wealthiest
academic research institution in the world, recently
announced that continuing its subscriptions to the full range
of scientific journals at an annual cost of $3.75 million would
be “financially untenable.”22
This period of sustained price increases, which continues
today,23 and the accompanying cancellation of journal
subscriptions by academic libraries has been termed the
serials crisis. The serials crisis prompted a widely-voiced
concern among libraries, scientists, and public interest
advocates that researchers were being deprived of access to
the latest developments in their fields, thereby adversely
(2004). Harvard University estimates that online journal subscriptions from
two major publishers have escalated by 145% over a six-year period.
Memorandum from the Harvard University Faculty Advisory Council to Faculty
Members in all Schools, Faculties, and Units, Major Periodical Subscriptions
Cannot be Sustained (April 17, 2012) [hereinafter Harvard FAC Memo],
available at http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k77982&tabgroupid
=icb.tabgroup143448. In response, Elsevier reports that its print list price
increases have averaged only five percent per year. Ian Sample, Harvard
University Says it Can’t Afford Journal Publishers’ Prices, THE GUARDIAN, Apr.
24, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/apr/24/harvard-universityjournal-publishers-prices.
20. According to one study, the average subscription cost of commerciallypublished journals in the field of economics in 2001 was over $1600. Theodore
C. Bergstrom, Free Labor for Costly Journals?, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 183 (2001).
Specialist publications, particularly in the medical literature, can cost in the
range of $20,000 per year. Pamela Burdman, A Quiet Revolt Puts Costly
Journals on Web, N.Y. TIMES , June 26, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com
/2004/06/26/arts/a-quiet-revolt-puts-costly-journals-on-web.html?pagewanted
=all&src=pm (citing the annual subscription rates of The Journal of
Comparative Neurology ($17,995) and Brain Research ($21,269)). Harvard
University has reported that some journal subscriptions cost as much as
$40,000 per year. Harvard FAC Memo, supra note 19.
21. Though this trend affected institutions and scientists worldwide, its
impact was felt most acutely at institutions in developing countries, some of
which were unable to sustain subscriptions to any relevant scientific
publications. See JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR
OPEN ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP 25 (William Y. Arms ed., 2006).
22. Harvard FAC Memo, supra note 19.
23. See Aaronson et al., supra note 8; Mark McCabe & Christopher M.
Snyder, The Economics of Open-Access Journals (2010) at 1, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=914525.
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impacting their own research and teaching.24
An
unawareness of the latest research findings makes it more
likely that scientists will conduct research that is duplicative
or that does not make use of the latest advances. And access
to the latest scientific literature is important not only for
researchers, but also for professionals who require up-to-date
technical knowledge in their fields. For example, one recent
study of healthcare workers (primarily physicians and
nurses) found that a lack of access to current medical
literature could have an impact on patient care.25 For all of
these reasons, limiting access to scientific research findings is
likely to have a negative impact on social welfare.
In this Article, I propose a reallocation of rights between
scientific authors and publishers in order to address the
serials crisis and reduce the social welfare losses that it has
occasioned. In Part I, I review the nature of the scientific
publishing market and the causes of the serials crisis. In
Parts II and III, I analyze existing proposals to address the
crisis, including Steven Shavell’s recent proposal to abolish
copyright in academic works and a number of open access
publishing models that have gained some measure of market
acceptance. In Part IV, I turn to mandated open access
approaches, including the U.S. NIH’s open access policy, and
discuss the potential pitfalls of relying on governmental
programs as long-term solutions. In Part V, I describe the
convergence of a number of existing open access efforts
defined by particular time periods after which scientific
literature is released to the public. Using these latency
periods as a basis, in Part VI, I propose that the most
effective means of addressing the crisis in scientific
publishing is to effect a shift in publishing norms using a
broadly-adopted license agreement that eliminates the
assignment of copyright to the publisher and allows only a
one-year exclusivity period before the publication must be
released to the public. I argue that such a shift is possible
24. See generally WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at 13–37; Access All Areas,
supra note 16.
25. See Jamie O’Keeffe, John Willinsky & Lauren Maggio, Public Access and
Use of Health Research: An Exploratory Study of the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) Public Access Policy Using Interviews and Surveys of Health
Professionals, 13 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 4 (2011).
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and has precedent in a similar shift that occurred in the
academic legal publishing market through the efforts of
academics in the 1990s.
I.

THE MAKING OF A CRISIS

In this Section, I describe the development of the
scientific publishing industry, particularly over the past
twenty years, and how certain characteristics of the industry
have led to the crisis that exists today. In particular, I
consider the role of copyright law in the publishing industry
and the ways in which broad copyright protection has
contributed to the serials crisis.
A. The Traditional Model of Scientific Publishing
Merton observes that an individual scientist’s rewards
consist in large part of recognition and esteem, both of which
are achieved through the communication of results to the
What’s more, the quantity and
scientific community.26
prestige of a researcher’s publications and the number of
citations they receive from others are critical factors in
Thus,
securing scarce government grant funding.27
researchers have significant personal incentives, both
reputational and financial, to publish their findings as
quickly as possible. The result is of personal benefit to
researchers, but also confers benefits on society.28

26. Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1751, 1800–01 (2010) (norms of scientific practice “mandate uncompensated
forfeiture of private knowledge in exchange for the prospect of reputational
prestige”); John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability:
Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101,
155–56 (2001) (discussing motivations of scientists); MERTON, supra note 7, at
274–75; see also NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 9, at 60 (“Researchers receive
intellectual credit for their work and recognition from their peers . . . when they
publish their results and share the data on which those results are based.”).
27. One NIH spokesperson has noted that “applicants with robust
publication histories, [and] proven track records of scientific accomplishment . .
. may have the edge over their younger, less experienced counterparts.” Bob
Grant, New NIH Forms Raise Concerns, THESCIENTIST.COM (Dec. 8, 2009),
http://www.the-scientist.com/blog/display/56209/.
28. See NAT. RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA
AND MATERIALS: RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE LIFE SCIENCES 34
(2003) (“[T]he act of publishing is a quid pro quo in which authors receive credit
and acknowledgement in exchange for disclosure of their scientific findings.”).
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Nothing of value, of course, comes free, and the route to
publication in a prestigious scientific journal is often difficult,
time-consuming, and circuitous. Once a researcher has made
a finding deemed worthy of publication,29 he or she must
write an article describing that finding together with
supporting data, illustrations and the like. The author then
submits the article to the most prestigious journal that he or
she deems likely to accept it. The most selective and
prestigious journals can publish only a small fraction of the
thousands of articles submitted to them each year, and a
scientist’s prominence and career advancement are
dependent, in large part, on the number of publications that
he or she places in highly regarded journals.30 Because most
journals prohibit or strongly discourage simultaneous
submissions, and because most journals’ review cycles take
weeks or months, scientists have an incentive to target their
papers to the highest-ranked journal with a realistic
possibility of acceptance.31
When a journal receives a submission, its editorial staff
conducts an initial screening review. Papers that do not meet
editorial guidelines, either due to inappropriate subject
matter (e.g., a paper on psychology that is submitted to an
oceanography journal), the significance of their conclusions
(e.g., a minor or incremental finding submitted to a highlyranked journal), poor writing, or failure to comply with
29. Because researchers are often rewarded for the sheer number of
publications that they produce, they sometimes strive to squeeze as many
papers as possible from a single project. This practice has resulted in an
increase in the total number of papers published, each of which consists of what
is ironically referred to as a Least Publishable Unit (LPU). William J. Broad,
The Publishing Game: Getting More for Less, 211 SCIENCE 1137 (1981).
30. The Thomson Reuters Journal Citation Reports (JCR) assign impact
factors to scientific journals based on a variety of factors including the number
of citations received by articles published in those journals. See RESEARCH
INFO. N ETWORK, TO S HARE OR N OT TO S HARE : PUBLICATION AND QUALITY
ASSURANCE OF R ESEARCH DATA O UTPUTS 25 (2008), available at
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/266742/1/Published_report_-_main_-_final.pdf
(the
assessment of researchers is “perceived to value above all else the publication of
papers in high-impact journals”); ZIMAN, supra note 11, at 180 (noting that in
terms of scientific success, “[o]ne paper with a hundred citations is worth
infinitely more than a hundred papers with one citation each”).
31. This is in contrast to disciplines such as law, in which the cost and effort
of simultaneously submitting a paper to multiple journals (often hundreds at
once) is extremely low and which results in the highest-ranked journals being
swamped with thousands of unsuitable papers for consideration.
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formatting or other editorial requirements, are rejected
quickly.
If a paper appears to fall broadly within the journal’s
guidelines, the staff editors may then submit it for review by
an editorial board consisting of respected scientists in the
field. If the paper appears to be significant enough to
publish, the editorial board will send it to two or more peer
reviewers (also known as referees) for evaluation and
comment.
Peer reviewers are selected based on their
research interests, experience, prominence in the field, and
often their own history of publishing with the journal. Peer
review can be conducted either blinded (the reviewers do not
know the identity of the authors) or unblinded (the identities
of the authors are known to the reviewers). Reviewers, once
selected, are asked by the journal to evaluate a submission
based on its scientific merit, originality, significance and, if
unblinded, the reputation of the authors. Peer reviewers will
seldom advise a journal to publish a paper as originally
submitted. Many papers, in fact, are rejected at this stage.
But if a paper is deemed to be of potential publishable
quality, reviewers will usually suggest a number of changes,
both editorial and substantive, and, occasionally, will require
additional experimentation or analysis.
The reviewers’
comments are returned by the journal to the author, who may
then revise the paper to address the comments and, if
necessary, gather additional data, refine the analysis, and
revise the paper. Once revised, the paper is resubmitted and
the process is repeated until the paper is either accepted or
rejected. If the paper is rejected, either initially or after
review, the author must select another journal and revise the
paper to comply with that journal’s formatting, length, and
editorial requirements.
This process is often repeated
multiple times until the paper is finally accepted for
publication by a journal.
Once accepted, the journal’s editorial staff may edit and
format the paper, check references, format figures and
images, and otherwise prepare the accepted paper for
publication. One recent study reports that the period from
completion of scientific work until publication is typically
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between twelve and eighteen months.32 Other studies have
found comparable or longer delay periods, depending on the
field.33
As time-consuming and frustrating as the journal
submission and peer review process may be, journals are
generally acknowledged to add value to the publication
process.34 Among their primary contributions are quality
control and selection, which they achieve both through their
own editorial review and by coordinating the peer review
process. Busy working scientists have limited time to study
the literature relevant to their fields and educate themselves
regarding new developments and discoveries. As a result,
scientists rely on journals and journal reputation to organize
and prioritize their intake of information and their limited
capacity to read the current literature.35 Journals thus act as
value-added intermediaries at several points between authors
and readers.36

32. Carlos B. Amat, Editorial and Publication Delay of Papers Submitted to
14 Selected Food Research Journals.
Influence of Online Posting, 74
SCIENTOMETRICS 379 (2008).
33. See William D. Garvey & Belver C. Griffith, Scientific Information
Exchange in Psychology, 146 SCIENCE 1655, 1656 (1964) (reporting that in the
psychology field, their study indicated that the time between hypothesis and
publication is between thirty and thirty-six months, and the time between
reportable results and publication is between eighteen and twenty-one months);
Charles G. Roland & Richard A. Kirkpatrick, Time Lapse Between Hypothesis
and Publication in the Medical Sciences, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1273, 1274
(1975) (finding delays of twenty and twenty-four months between the
completion of research and publication, respectively, for medical laboratory
research and clinical research studies). Anecdotally, the author has been
informed that publication delays are typically even longer in the social sciences.
34. See, e.g., McCabe & Snyder, supra note 23.
35. One study shows that, on average, a scientist will only read between 100
and 200 scientific articles per year from eighteen to twenty-six different
journals, out of more than one million peer-reviewed scientific articles published
annually. Carol Tenopir & Donald W. King, The Use and Value of Scientific
Journals: Past, Present and Future, 14 SERIALS 113–14, 117 (2001).
36. In economic terms, scientific publishers have been analyzed as
intermediaries in a two-sided market, intermediating between authors on one
side and readers on the other. See McCabe & Snyder, supra note 23, at 4.
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B. The (New) Economics of Scientific Publishing
1. Cost
The economic model enjoyed by scientific journals is
fairly simple and enviable. On the cost side, journals obtain
the majority of their content for free. Unlike publishers of
general interest periodicals and newspapers, they employ
few, if any, writers, reporters, and photographers.37 And
unlike most book publishers, journals pay no author royalties.
Rather, as described above, scientists submit their work to
journals solely in exchange for intangible benefits such as
reputational enhancement, career advancement, and
improved odds of securing grant funding—benefits that are
not funded directly by the journals. What’s more, these same
scientists perform a significant quality control and editorial
function for the journals as peer reviewers. Again, they
donate their services without direct compensation to enhance
their own relationships with journals and as inherent duties
of their academic positions.
Of course, journals do incur operational costs relating to
submissions management, article screening, selection and
coordination of peer reviewers, copy editing, art production,
publication (both in print and online), marketing, and
distribution. After publication, journals incur ongoing costs
associated with maintaining and archiving articles online,
making supplementary materials and data available, offering
search and indexing functionality, publishing related
correspondence,
technical
comments
and
occasional
retractions,38 and sometimes handling legal claims that may
be made with respect to published articles.39
37. In addition to scientific papers, many journals also publish editorials,
correspondence and short news stories of potential interest to their readership.
Some of this content is provided by paid correspondents or freelance writers.
38. See Adam Mossoff, How Copyright Drives Innovation in Scholarly
Publishing, GEORGE MASON UNIV. LAW & ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES 13-25, 1721 (May 2013) (describing significant costs incurred by publishers in creating
online and other resources, managing peer review and the like); Letter from
Alan I. Leshner, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Publisher, Science, to
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) (Jan. 12, 2012) (on file with
author).
39. Such claims may involve allegations of defamation, scientific
misconduct, fraud, plagiarism, copyright infringement and conflict of interest.
While ultimate legal liability for such claims may rest with the authors and/or
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Estimates of the costs incurred by scientific publishers
vary. By one estimate, publication costs for a single article in
the most prestigious scientific journals can run up to
$10,000.40 Others estimate that first copy costs of publishing
an article in a scientific journal (i.e., excluding printing,
distribution, marketing, and overhead expenses) typically run
between $1000 and $4000.41
2. Revenue
The traditional journal revenue model is based on
subscription sales to academic libraries.42 Libraries acquire
journal subscriptions to make their content available to
researchers within their institutions. In the past, this meant
that paper copies of journals would be routed to relevant
researchers or placed in departmental lounges before being
archived in the library’s general collection. Today, most
scientific journals are distributed electronically (sometimes in
addition to print copies), and an institutional subscription
entitles affiliated researchers to access the journal’s articles
in electronic form.
As discussed in the Introduction, the subscription model
for scientific journals worked without major incident until the
large-scale entrance of commercial publishers following World
War II.43 Beginning in the 1960s, the number of scientific
journals began to proliferate, so that over the last fifty years
the number of individual journal titles has increased by
approximately a factor of ten.44 Together with the expanding
number
of
journals,
subscription
rates
increased
dramatically, resulting in widespread cancellation of
their institutions, journals are often the first responders when such claims are
made.
40. Jocelyn Kaiser, Free Journals Grow Among Ongoing Debate, 329
S CIENCE 896, 897 (2010).
41. Donald W. King, The Cost of Journal Publishing: A Literature Review
and Commentary, 20 LEARNED PUBLISHING 85, 93–95 (2007); cf. THE
WELLCOME TRUST, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PUBLISHING
13 (2004), available at http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite
/@policy_communications/documents/web_document/wtd003182.pdf.
For
additional data, see Mosoff, supra note 38.
42. See, e.g., WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at 18–19; THE WELLCOME TRUST,
supra note 41, at 15.
43. See, e.g., WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at 13–14.
44. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
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subscriptions and, as discussed above, the so-called serials
crisis.45 According to a 1997 study conducted by Page,
Campbell and Meadows, subscription revenue still accounts
for approximately eighty-five percent of total revenue for
journals in the sciences.46
In addition to subscription revenue, scientific journals
earn income from reprint sales (encompassing printed
reprints, permissions for reproduction, and one-time access to
electronic copies).47 According to one estimate, a single
highly-cited article can generate reprint revenue of up to
$700,000.48 However, most articles generate little or no
reprint revenue. Page, Campbell and Meadows report that
combined reprint revenue accounts for approximately eight
percent of total revenue for journals in the sciences.49
Another potential revenue source for some journals is
advertising. In 2008, for example, the American Medical
Association, publisher of the prestigious Journal of the
American Medical Association (JAMA) reported that
advertising generated forty-nine percent of its total
The percentage, however, is
publishing revenue.50
significantly lower for commercial publishers that have a
larger overall revenue base. Page, Campbell and Meadows
report that five percent of journal revenue is attributable to
advertising.51
Both revenue and operating margins for scientific
publishers are sizeable. As noted above, the overall annual
market for scientific journals is estimated to be between $7
and $10 billion.52 A few large publishers, however, dominate
the field. In 2009, the two largest, Elsevier and Wolters
Kluwer, earned annual revenues of approximately $3 billion
and $1 billion, respectively, and each enjoyed profit margins
45. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
46. GILLIAN PAGE, ROBERT CAMPBELL & ARTHUR JACK MEADOWS, JOURNAL
PUBLISHING 65 tbl.6.5, reprinted in THE WELLCOME TRUST, supra note 41.
47. E. Ray Dorsey et al., Finances of the Publishers of the Most Highly Cited
US Medical Journals, 99 J. MED. LIBR. ASS’N 255, 257 (2011).
48. Id.
49. PAGE, CAMPBELL & MEADOWS, supra note 46, at 65 tbl.6.5.
50. Dorsey et al., supra note 47. Note, however, that the AMA, as a nonprofit publisher, charges far lower subscription rates than commercial
publishers.
51. PAGE, CAMPBELL & MEADOWS, supra note 46, at 65 tbl.6.5.
52. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
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in excess of thirty percent.53
3. The Journal Pricing Debate
The complaint that elevated subscription pricing shuts
out too many potential consumers may at first seem
inconsistent with basic economic theory.
Absent
governmental regulation or violations of antitrust law,
producers generally have no obligation to price their goods so
that every potential consumer can afford them. Assuming
that scientific papers are unique works that are not easily
substitutable,54 pricing of scientific journals would be
expected to approach the publisher’s profit-maximizing point.
That is, in the market for a product as to which there are few
and/or imperfect substitutes, a producer (acting as a
monopolist55) will increase its price up to the point above
which further increases would result in diminished demand
and lower overall profit. At this point some quantity of
consumers will purchase the product, but fewer than the
number that would purchase it at a perfectly competitive
price. If the producer sets the price of its products too high, it
will forego profits. One could argue, therefore, that journal
publishers have no incentive to over-charge for subscriptions,
as this tactic would inure to their own detriment.
One might counter, however, that just because a small
number of wealthy institutions can afford journals’ high
subscription rates, the market is not working efficiently.
Instead this situation is symptomatic of a market failure that

53. Dorsey et al., supra note 47, at 256. In contrast, the top ten non-profit
publishers of medical journals earned total combined revenues of less than $200
million in 2008. Id. The Economist reports Elsevier’s 2010 profit margin at
thirty-six percent. Of Goats and Headaches, THE ECONOMIST, May 26, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/18744177.
54. Felix S. Chew, Kevin T. Llewellyn & Kathryn M. Olsen, Electronic
Publishing in Radiology: Economics and the Future, 1 J. AM. COLL. RADIOLOGY
815 (2004) (supporting the notion of non-substitutability of journals in
radiology).
55. The scientific publishing market may more accurately be described as
one of monopolistic competition, in which products (journals) do not serve as
substitutes for one another, but in which producers (publishers) do exhibit some
characteristics of market competitors. The publishing industry is generally
viewed as exhibiting the characteristics of monopolistic competition. See
generally N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 329–31 (6th
ed. 2012).
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reduces overall social welfare,56 namely the advancement of
scientific progress. Scientific literature, one would argue, is
not a luxury good, the overall distribution and production of
which society is indifferent to. Rather, the broad distribution
of scientific knowledge is itself a social good that should be
encouraged, or at least not stymied through the pricing action
of non-producing intermediaries such as publishers. The loss
of utility experienced by consumers who do not purchase a
product at the monopolistic publisher’s profit-maximizing
price is termed deadweight loss.
This critique echoes the criticism of pharmaceutical
manufacturers in the access to medicines debate. These
manufacturers are alleged to have charged monopolistic
profit-maximizing prices for patented drugs in developing
countries, where only a tiny fraction of the population can
afford them.57 In this market, deadweight loss can be equated
to a reduction in access to life-saving medications, and a
corresponding social benefit can be derived from minimizing
this deadweight loss.
In the case of scientific publishing, deadweight loss is
created when institutions are unable or unwilling to pay a
journal’s subscription rates and are thus unable to give their
faculty access to the journal’s content. In other words, the
deadweight loss represented by the inability of scientists to
access scientific information results in less overall scientific
advancement—fewer
medical
and
technological
The
breakthroughs—and is thus socially undesirable.58
56. Landes and Posner argue that total welfare should not be affected by
losses to consumers from higher prices in markets dominated by copyright.
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 81–82 (2003). This view, however, assumes a
regime in which the creation of copyrighted works is affected by the level of
copyright protection. In the case of scientific publishing, incentives for authors
are typically independent of copyright protection. See, e.g., Frank MuellerLanger & Richard Watt, Copyright and Open Access for Academic Works, 7 REV.
ECON. RES . ON COPYRIGHT I SSUES 45, 47–48 (2010); Steven Shavell, Should
Copyright of Academic Works be Abolished?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 301 (2010).
57. See, e.g., Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis, & Mike Palmedo, An Economic
Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in Developing
Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 185 (2009); Jerome H. Reichman,
Comment: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions:
Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 250 (2009).
58. Suboptimal social welfare may result not only from loss of access by
institutions unable to afford publishers’ profit-maximizing rates, but also from
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reported effects of the serials crisis on actual institutions,
both within the industrialized world and, more tellingly, in
the developing world, support the argument that overall
scientific progress may be less than it otherwise could be
absent the publishing industry’s current pricing structure.59
Journals, of course, incur costs, and many critics
acknowledge that scientific publishers contribute value to the
publishing enterprise. Landes and Posner remind us of this
often-neglected element of the equation:
[w]e must not ignore the publishers . . . . Given substantial
fixed costs of publication and easy copiability, publishers
may need copyright protection in order to be able to
recover their fixed costs even if they don’t have to pay a
cent for the expressive content of what they publish.60

Critics counter, however, that the escalating subscription
rates charged by journals have far outstripped mere cost
recovery and cannot be justified on this basis alone.61 The
reported thirty percent-plus profit margins of major
commercial publishers, substantially in excess of margins
elsewhere in the publishing industry,62 would seem to support
this
assertion.
Moreover,
unlike
pharmaceutical
those that can afford these rates, as the excess rent paid by research
institutions to publishers (whether funded internally or by government grants)
is diverted to publishers and away from the funding of further scientific
research. And unlike other monopolists, such as patent-holding pharmaceutical
manufacturers, who arguably utilize excess profits to fund further research and
development, scientific publishers do not themselves fund any scientific
research.
59. See, e.g., WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at
93–94 (describing the
devastating loss of subscriptions by research institutions in the developing
world); Barbara Aronson, Improving Online Access to Medical Information for
Low-Income Countries, 350 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 9668 (2004) (reporting the
results of a 2001 WHO study finding that fifty-six percent of all research
institutions in the lowest-income tier countries had no subscriptions to
international scientific journals and twenty-one percent averaged only two such
subscriptions; and even in the next income tier, thirty-four percent had no
subscriptions, and thirty-four percent had between two and five such
subscriptions).
60. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 56, at 53.
61. See, e.g., McCabe & Snyder, supra note 23, at 1.
62. See Ernst & Young, New Study Shows Profitability and Growth in
Media
and
Entertainment
(Mar.
14,
2011),
available
at
http://www.ey.com/US/en/Newsroom/
News-releases/New-study-shows-profitability-and-growth-in-media-andentertainment (finding average twenty percent profitability in publishing
industry).
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manufacturers, scientific journals do not require even a
portion the financial incentives permitted by monopolistic
pricing in order to fund the creation of new scientific works,
as these works are created by scientists who are not
financially compensated by the journals.
C. Leveraging Copyright
Given that both the bulk of the content that they publish
and a significant editorial and quality-control function are
provided to journals for free by their own customers, how
have commercial publishers managed to escalate the prices of
scientific journals to monopolistic levels that, by most
accounts, are far in excess of their costs? Reputational factors
and the dependence of scientists on publication in prestigious
journals give journals significant leverage to attract highquality articles notwithstanding their pricing policies.63 But
once a journal attracts an article, it retains its absolute
control over the article through copyright law.
1. Why Copyright Matters
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to
secure to authors the exclusive right to their writings for
limited times in order to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.”64 Thus, according to the well-known incentivebased copyright argument, authors must be granted some
exclusivity in their works if they are to be persuaded to create
them in the first place.65 As Thomas Macaulay explained in
1841, copyright imposes “a tax on readers for the purpose of
giving a bounty to writers.”66
As an initial matter, however, it is not immediately
apparent why copyright law matters at all in scientific
63. Journals’ relative impunity in this area is bolstered by the separation of
research and library functions at most institutions.
64. U.S. CONST . art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
65. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 56, at 11. But see Stan J. Leibowitz, Is
Efficient Copyright a Reasonable Goal?, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1692 (2011)
(arguing that economic efficiency is not a reasonable goal of copyright law).
66. Thomas B. Macaulay, The First Speech on Copyright, February 5, 1841,
in MACAULAY’S SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT AND LINCOLN’S ADDRESS AT COOPER
UNION 18, 25 (Charles Robert Gaston ed., 1914) (quoted in Stephen G. Breyer,
The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Look Back Across Four Decades, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1635, 1641 (2011)).
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publishing. The law is well-settled that scientific facts, data,
and discoveries are not themselves copyrightable.67 And,
unlike most other works of authorship (e.g., novels, musical
compositions, paintings, and screenplays), there is little
creative expression in the text of scientific journal articles,
and only marginally more in their illustrations and figures.
The primary, if not the only, goal of such articles is to
communicate new scientific data, findings and conclusions to
an interested audience of fellow scientists. The manner of
expression, the language in which the article is written,
provided that it is generally comprehensible to the intended
audience, is irrelevant.68
For example, below are two short descriptions of the
same scientific finding. The first is an excerpt from the
abstract of an actual scientific article, the second is a
rewording of that excerpt in a form that conveys the same
information (to the best of this author’s limited ability), but
via a different form of expression.
Although eye color is usually modeled as a simple,
Mendelian trait, further research and observation has
indicated that eye color does not follow the classical paths
of inheritance . . . . Although there are about 16 different
genes responsible for eye color, it is mostly attributed to
two adjacent genes on chromosome 15.69
Despite the typical modeling of eye color heritability in
classical Mendelian terms, our research shows that eye
color is not determined through traditional inheritance
67. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(stating that a compilation of facts may be copyrightable, but the facts
themselves can never be the subject of copyright); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (finding that the factual element of news is not
copyrightable). See generally J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually
Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist
Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS . 315, 337–38
(2003) (describing the thin copyright in scientific works and data).
68. In fact, the prose in which scientific articles are written has frequently
been criticized for its density, turgidity and generally poor quality. See, e.g.,
Rachel Toor, Bad Writing and Bad Thinking, CHRON. HIGHER ED. (Apr. 15,
2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Bad-WritingBad-Thinking/65031/ (criticizing
scholarly writing that uses “multisyllabic words, complex phrasing, and
sentences that go on for days” and noting that “[i]f you're too clear, if your
sentences are too simple, your peers won't take you seriously”).
69. Désirée White & Montserrat Rabago-Smith, Genotype-Phenotype
Associations and Human Eye Color, 56 J. HUMAN GENETICS 5 (2011).
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pathways. . . . We identify a pair of neighboring genes
along chromosome 15 that are found to have primary
responsibility for determining eye color, among the sixteen
or so genes that are generally credited with affecting this
trait.

Though these two statements arguably convey the same
scientific information (two genes out of sixteen strongly
influence inherited eye color), the two modes in which this
idea is expressed are sufficiently distinct that the second
version should not infringe the copyright in the first.70 Thus,
even if dissemination of the first statement were barred by
the owner of the copyright (a journal), that copyright owner
could not restrict dissemination of the second statement.
If this is the case, then what would prevent scientific
authors from recreating each of their copyrighted articles in a
different guise and allowing the second versions to be
distributed free of the control of publishers?
Legally
speaking, this approach might be viable.
Practically
speaking, however, such rephrasing would require a
significant amount of work by the author—work that would
not result in any material benefit. There is a low likelihood
that busy scientists, racing to obtain grant funding and
publish their latest findings, would take the time to rewrite
each of their articles simply to help others who could not
afford to subscribe to certain journals. And what about
rewriting by graduate students, laboratory technicians, or
even undergraduate work-study students? While no formal
study has been conducted, scientists whom I have informally
queried claim that they would be unlikely to read or give
much credence to such rewritten articles. They would be
concerned about reliability and the introduction of errors,
70. Infringement of the exclusive right to reproduce, absent direct evidence
of copying, can be established when the alleged copier had access to the original
and the alleged copy is substantially similar to the original. Kay Berry, Inc. v.
Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005); Fogerty v. MGM Grp. Holdings
Corp., 379 F.3d 348, 352 (6th Cir. 2004). The similarity comparison does not
take into account un-copyrightable materials, such as facts. See Feist Publ’ns,
Inc., 499 U.S. at 348. Once unprotected aspects are removed the substantial
similarity analysis “asks whether an ‘ordinary observer’ would perceive the
original and the alleged copy as substantially similar.” Fogerty, 379 F.3d at 352
(quoting Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 855–57 (6th Cir. 2003)). Once the facts
are removed from the two paragraphs, the second is not substantially similar to
the first and does not infringe the exclusive right of copying.
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about losing the nuances of an experienced researcher’s
reasoning, and about the interpretive exigencies of any
translation exercise. Thus, even for scientific works, it
appears that copyright cannot easily be circumvented, and
that any solution to the serials crisis must address copyright
head-on.
2. Author’s Assignment of Rights
Under modern copyright law, the author of a literary
work has a number of exclusive rights, including the rights to
reproduce, distribute, and display the work.71 The authors of
scientific journal articles, which generally qualify as literary
works, are also entitled to these exclusive rights.72 But when
a scientific article is accepted for publication in a journal, the
publisher typically requires that the author assign to it the
full copyright in the article.73 This assignment of copyright
gives the publisher complete and exclusive control over the
reproduction, dissemination and publication of the work, even
as to the original author and his or her institution.74 And
while some limited rights to use the work for educational and
research purposes may be available under the fair use
doctrine,75 these rights cannot be exercised unless the user
has access to a copy of the work. Thus, one of a publisher’s
key assets is the ability to prevent those who have not paid

71. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
72. Under the Copyright Act, ownership of a copyrightable work vests in the
author upon fixation of the work in a tangible medium. Id. § 102(a). But in the
case of employees who create copyrighted works within the scope of their
employment (works made for hire), their employers are treated as the authors
and thereby obtain ownership of the copyright. Id. § 101. An exception to this
rule has been recognized in the case of academic authors, most of whom are
employed by a university or other institution, but who typically retain copyright
in works either through contractual arrangement with their institution or via
the so-called teacher exception to the work made for hire doctrine. See Eric
Priest, Copyright, Scholarship, Authorial Autonomy, and the “Harvard” Open
Access Mandate, 10 NW. J.L. S CI . TECH. 377, 403 (2012).
73. See, e.g., Mueller-Langer & Watt, supra note 56, at 47.
74. In economic terms, copyright enables the journal publisher to act as a
monopolist in the market for readers. See Frank Mueller-Langer & Richard
Watt, Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous
Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-Sided Model, TILEC DISCUSSION
PAPER, DP 2012-19 at 1–2 (Apr. 25, 2012).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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for a work from accessing it.76
3. Copyright Duration
As observed by Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi,
Despite the
copyright is both long and strong.77
Constitutional restriction of the term of an author’s copyright
exclusivity to limited times, the term of copyright protection
in the United States has grown steadily over the years.
Under the original Copyright Act of 1790, Congress set the
maximum period of exclusivity at twenty-eight years (an
initial term of fourteen years plus a fourteen-year renewal
term).78 Since then, the term of copyright in the United
States has steadily increased.79 Today, under the 1998 Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, the copyright term for
most works is the life of the author plus seventy years.80 The
term of protection can thus easily exceed a century. Because
of this extraordinary protective period, the exclusive rights
controlled by publishers enable them to control the market for
scientific works for the entire useful life of those works.
Interestingly, had the current copyright regime then
been in effect, the works of Nicola Tesla (1856–1943) and
George Washington Carver (1864–1943), each of whom made
significant scientific discoveries during the nineteenth
century, and most scientists who followed them, would still be
protected by copyright in 2012. What if only a handful of
scientists at wealthy institutions had access to the corpus of
scientific literature of the last century? One can only
speculate (with some dismay) about the effect that such a
lengthy restrictive regime might have had on the progress of
76. Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L.
105-304, prohibits any attempt to circumvent electronic protection measures to
access a digitally protected work, even if the purpose is to exercise fair use
rights. For a critique of this level of legal protection in the context of scientific
data, see Reichman & Uhlir, supra, note 67, at 376–79.
77. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE—HOW
TO PUT BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT 16 (2011).
78. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 § 1 (1790).
79. The extension of copyright term is not unique to the United States. See
Council Directive 93/98/EEC (2003) (implementing the same copyright term
length for authors later reflected in the Sonny Bono Act in the United States).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c). For anonymous works, pseudonymous works and
works made for hire, the copyright term expires ninety-five years from
publication or 120 years from creation, whichever occurs first. Id.
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science.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly affirmed the ability of Congress to
extend the term of copyright protection at these levels. Most
notably, when the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Act
was challenged in Eldred v. Ashcroft,81 Justice Ginsburg,
writing for the majority, relied on “[t]ext, history, and
precedent” to confirm that the Copyright Clause grants
Congress broad power to establish the term of copyright
protection,82 and declined to “ ‘alter the delicate balance
Congress has labored to achieve.’ ”83 Even more recently, in
Golan v. Holder,84 Justice Ginsburg again affirmed the power
of Congress to expand the scope of copyright protection
without significant restraint.85
Thus, the long horizon of copyright protection, coupled
with the assignment of copyright by authors to publishers,
has resulted in a situation in which publishers who neither
create nor fund the creation of scientific works exert nearabsolute control over their distribution, and charge the
market accordingly. The result has been a curtailment of the
literature available to many members of the scientific
community, an undesirable result from a social welfare
standpoint.
It is my goal in this Article to propose a modified
scientific publishing model that both compensates publishers
fairly for the value that they add as intermediaries, while at
the same time ensuring that the published scientific
literature is made broadly available to the scientific
community to enable the continuing advancement of science.

81. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
82. Id. at 187. But see id. at 244–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Congress’s extension of copyright terms should be subject to a rationality test).
83. Id. at 205 n.10 (majority opinion) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S.
207, 230 (1990)).
84. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (challenge to Congress’ grant of
copyright protection to works already in the public domain).
85. Id. at 878 (“We conclude that § 514 does not transgress constitutional
limitations on Congress' authority. Neither the Copyright and Patent Clause
nor the First Amendment, we hold, makes the public domain, in any and all
cases, a territory that works may never exit.”).
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II. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS THROUGH COPYRIGHT REFORM
In this Section, I address Steven Shavell’s recent
proposal to abolish copyright in academic works as a solution
to the crisis in scientific publishing. I analyze this proposal
as a tailoring solution targeting the problem of uniformity
cost using the three-part analytical framework proposed by
Michael Carroll.
A. Abolishing Academic Copyright?
If copyright law caused the serials crisis, then it stands to
reason that substantive changes to copyright law can
alleviate it. Steven Shavell, perhaps the most prominent
scholar to advocate this approach, argues that copyright in
academic works should be abolished altogether.86 While this
conclusion may, at first blush, sound extravagant, Shavell’s
careful reasoning bears consideration.87
First, Shavell suggests that “the conventional rationale
for copyright of written works—that it stimulates their
creation and publication by allowing authors to profit from
their sale—is seemingly of limited applicability to academic

86. Shavell, supra note 56, at 301. Shavell is not, of course, the first scholar
to argue for the abolition or severe curtailment of copyright term. Debating the
appropriate duration of intellectual property protection has been a favorite
pastime of academic commentators for decades. See generally LISA A. GIDDINGS
& STEPHEN A. SCHNEIDER, ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 5–7 (1999) (reviewing the work of economists including Arrow (1962),
Nordhaus (1962 and 1969), Kamien and Schwartz (1974) and Scherer (1984)).
In the area of copyright, specifically, see MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE,
AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 15 (2008) (“[t]he basic conclusion of this
book is that intellectual monopoly—patents, copyrights, and restrictive
licensing agreements—are unnecessary”); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS 250–52 (2001) (arguing for a renewable five-year copyright term, with a
particular focus on online content); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (arguing that extension of copyright
terms is unnecessary). For a contrary view, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note
56, at 215–16 (presenting the economic argument for copyrights of indefinite
duration, subject to ongoing renewal requirements).
87. In this brief summary I cannot do justice to the economic model
developed by Shavell, and will primarily address his qualitative reasoning and
conclusions. An alternative to the Shavell model is presented in a paper by
Frank Mueller-Langer and Richard Watt. Mueller-Langer & Watt, supra note
74, at 24 (concluding that removal of copyright could have different effects
depending on market configuration).

3_CONTRERAS FINAL.DOC

2013]

7/23/2013 9:25 PM

THE CRISIS IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING

515

authors.”88 To this end, he observes that academics possess
strong incentives to publish scholarly work that are wholly
independent of copyright.
As discussed above, these
incentives include recognition, career advancement, and
support of grant applications. By the same token, academics
receive little if any direct pecuniary gain from the publication
of scholarly articles.89 Thus, the financial incentives that
copyright protection may offer to the authors of works of
fiction, musical compositions, and other copyrighted works do
not necessarily apply to works of academic scholarship, and
the abolition of copyright on academic works would likely
have little impact on the overall production of these works or
the financial returns to their authors.
Next, Shavell considers the potential impact of abolishing
academic copyright on publishers. He acknowledges that
publishers incur costs associated with their services as
intermediaries.90 He also postulates that absent copyright,
there would be no effective means for them to prevent others
from copying and distributing published works soon after
their initial appearance.91 In the face of rapid, inexpensive,
and legal copying, it would become impossible for journals to
charge readers for their content (i.e., driving subscription and
reprint rates to marginal cost, effectively zero). Publishers
would thus need to look elsewhere to recoup their costs.92
Absent subscription revenues, publishers would most likely
turn to authors. In such an author-pays model, the author’s
institution (either itself or through grant funding) might or
might not cover publication costs. Shavell acknowledges that
if an author’s institution did not cover publication costs, then
88. Shavell, supra note 56, at 301–02 (footnote omitted). For a statement of
the traditional incentive-based argument for copyright, see LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 56, at 13 (“[t]he dynamic benefit of a property right is the incentive
that possession of such a right imparts to invest in the creation or improvement
of a resource . . . . It enables people to reap where they have sown.”).
89. Shavell’s proposal deals both with academic journal articles and books.
Given the focus of my analysis on the serials crisis and means that have been
proposed to alleviate its effects, I do not address his analysis of scholarly books
in detail.
90. Shavell, supra note 56, at 302–03, 306.
91. Id. at 317, 328.
92. In a world without copyright, Shavell envisions most publication
occurring electronically, without printing and distribution costs. He thus
focuses exclusively on publisher first copy costs. Id. at 317.
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the abolition of copyright might have a negative impact on
the production of scholarly work (as authors would probably
be reluctant to pay journal fees out of their personal funds).93
However, Shavell argues that institutions and funders would
have numerous reasons to cover these costs (e.g., to ensure
that the work conducted by researchers they support
continues to be published), and would likely have the means
to do so.94 In such a world, authors would not be financially
disadvantaged by the abolition of copyright, resulting in no
net increase or decrease in the number of scholarly works
produced; publishers would recover their costs and thus
continue to perform as value-added intermediaries; and the
free availability of such works to the public would yield a
significant social benefit.95 Thus, Shavell concludes that the
abolition of copyright in academic works should be seriously
considered as a possible solution to the serials crisis.96
B. The Challenge of Tailoring Copyright Term
Shavell’s proposal to abolish copyright on academic works
would adjust the intellectual property rights awarded by
Congress to authors based on the peculiar incentive
structures of the scientific publishing industry. Michael
Carroll refers to this type of industry-specific calibration as
tailoring,97 and observes that tailoring can reduce
inefficiencies created by one-size-fits-all intellectual property
regimes. That is, under the current copyright system, once a
work is determined to be copyrightable subject matter, the
term of protection is uniform, no matter what the nature of
the work or its author. This blunt approach overcompensates
creators in industries in which the incentives to produce new
works do not require the level of protection afforded by the
law. This overcompensation comes at the expense of the
public, which has limited rights to exploit the work during
the term of protection, resulting in a net social cost without
93. Id.
94. In this vein, he argues that universities would be more than capable of
funding such author fees from the savings they realize by no longer having to
pay subscription fees for academic journals. Id. at 232.
95. Id. at 328–30.
96. Id. at 330.
97. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework For
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO S T . L.J. 1361 (2009).
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an offsetting gain in the production of new works. This cost,
which results from the application of a uniform exclusive
term to all forms of copyrighted works, has been termed
uniformity cost.98 According to Carroll, “uniformity cost is the
central problem that intellectual property law must
Robert Merges has framed the problem of
manage.”99
uniformity cost in terms of proportionality, reasoning “that a
property right ought to be reasonably related to something
socially useful and valuable. Where the unregulated market
price of a property right moves radically out of alignment
with underlying social utility, an institutional response is
called for.”100
Proposals to tailor the scope and term of intellectual
property rights based on the characteristics and requirements
of particular industries have long been attractive to scholars
and advocates. As long ago as 1884, Congressional backers of
the newspaper industry sought (unsuccessfully) to enact an
eight-hour copyright on the news.101 More recently, Dan Burk
and Mark Lemley have pointed to significant differences in
the cost and incentive structures of the pharmaceutical
industry, on one hand, and the information technology
industry, on the other hand.102 These differences, they argue,
cannot be accounted for under the uniform twenty-year
patent term afforded under U.S. law, giving rise to significant
market inefficiencies and net social cost.103

98. See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 847 (2006).
99. Id. at 849.
100. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 181 (2011).
101. News Copyright Bill of 1884. This legislative attempt was defeated.
Thirty-two years later, the Supreme Court held that news facts are not subject
to copyright protection, though the expression of the news in written stories
might be, concurrently creating the so-called hot news doctrine based on state
law tort of misappropriation. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918).
102. See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND
HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009).
103. Specifically, Burk and Lemley argue that while a twenty-year patent
term might be appropriate to incentivize innovation in the pharmaceutical
industry, with its lengthy, capital-intensive product development cycles and
multi-year regulatory approval process, it is almost certainly not appropriate in
the software industry, in which development cycles are a few months and
involve few capital expenditures. See id. at 77–92.
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In general, applying a uniform set of intellectual property
rules to different industries and technologies is inefficient,
and tailoring of these rights presents a way to reduce this
inefficiency.104 However, as Carroll points out, “tailoring
intellectual property rights well is not easily done.”105 In
order to aid policymakers in assessing the feasibility of
increasing social welfare through tailoring of intellectual
property rights, Carroll offers a useful analytical
framework.106 In this framework, he posits three conditions
that must be satisfied if efficiency gains are to be achieved by
tailoring: (1) there must be reliable evidence that uniformity
costs exist and that they can be reduced by tailoring (I term
this the likely effectiveness of the tailoring proposal), (2) the
measures proposed to eliminate these uniformity costs must
be administratively feasible, and (3) the tailoring proposal
must be politically feasible.107
Shavell’s tailoring proposal would abolish copyright in
academic works through an amendment to the Copyright Act.
It is worth assessing this proposal in terms of Carroll’s threepart framework.108
1. Effectiveness
Shavell’s arguments regarding the mismatch between
copyright protection and incentives to create works of
academic scholarship are consistent with a large body of
previous criticism of the academic publishing market. Thus, I
will assume arguendo that uniformity costs exist in this
market and that the tailoring of intellectual property rights
can lead to greater efficiencies and social welfare.
It is less clear, however, that Shavell’s specific proposal
to abolish copyright on academic works would achieve optimal
104. See Carroll, supra note 98, at 848 (“[P]erfectly tailored rights that
promise innovators only the expected value required to induce socially desirable
innovation would be theoretically optimal.”).
105. Carroll, supra note 97, at 1366.
106. Id. at 1406–07.
107. Id.
108. Shavell’s economic model and assumptions have also been critiqued.
See, e.g., Mueller-Langer & Watt, supra note 74; Hossein Nabilou, A Response to
Prof. Shavell’s ‘Should Copyright of Academic Works Be Abolished?,’ 7 REV.
ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 31 (2010). An analysis of the Shavell formal
model and its critiques is beyond the scope of this Article.
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results. If copyright in academic works were abolished then,
as discussed above, commercial publishers would likely turn
to authors to cover their costs. The economics of an authorpays world are not well understood. Today, a number of open
access scientific journals have adopted author-pays models,109
but these are still a small fraction of the overall market. If
the entire scientific publishing industry moved from a
subscriber-pays to an author-pays model, there is a risk that
the current reader-side serials crisis would simply be
transformed into an author-side serials crisis. That is, once
all publishers are operating under an author-pays model,
what would prevent the subsequent escalation of author fees
on a scale mirroring the escalation of subscriber fees today?
In other words, if competition has not mediated price
escalation on the subscriber side (due to the general
inelasticity of journal prices) and publishers have been able to
extract super-competitive rents from subscribers, it is
possible that the same market forces would allow a similar
escalation of author fees, particularly among the most
prestigious and desirable (from an author’s standpoint)
publications.
Moreover, it is not clear that authors or their institutions
would be willing or able to pay author-side fees once they are
required by all journals (as opposed to the small percentage of
journals levying such fees today). If not, then authors (as
opposed to readers) could become priced out of the academic
scholarship market or some number of journals could fail.110
In either scenario, the dissemination of scholarly work could
decrease, leading to a decrease in available scientific
knowledge that could rival the decrease caused by the serials
crisis on the reader side. Thus, until further empirical and
modeling work is done to assess the potential market effects
of such a radical economic shift, it would be difficult to
conclude that the abolition of copyright in academic works
would be effective in increasing social welfare.
109. See infra Part III.B.2.
110. Cf. MARY WALTHAM, THE FUTURE OF SCHOLARLY JOURNALS
PUBLISHING AMONG SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES ASSOCIATIONS 19 (2009),
available at http://www.nhalliance.org/bm~doc/hssreport.pdf (noting that of ten
social sciences and humanities journals studied, most could not move to an
author-pays model with their current cost structures).
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2. Administrability
Carroll’s second test queries whether “the distinctions
drawn [by a tailoring solution] are jurisprudentially stable
and administratively cost-effective.”111 An example of a rule
that is relatively easy to administer is section 105 of the
Copyright Act, which denies copyright protection to works
created by U.S. government employees.112 To apply this
exclusion one must simply determine whether or not the
author of a particular work is an “officer or employee of the
U.S. Government” and whether the work was prepared
within the scope of that person’s governmental duties.113 To
the extent that questions have been raised around its edges
(e.g., whether government contractors should be considered
government employees), they can be answered definitively by
the courts.
The distinction proposed by Shavell between academic
and non-academic works, however, is less clearly delineated.
His proposal would exclude from copyright academic works,
encompassing both books and articles in all academic
disciplines.114 Yet many authors of articles in scientific
journals are not full-time faculty at academic institutions, but
employees of corporations, government agencies,115 and notfor-profit institutions such as hospitals, think tanks, advocacy
groups and the like. This is especially true in fields such as
pharmaceutical development, engineering, computer science,
and economics. It is not clear how Shavell would deal with
scientific articles published by non-academic authors, not to
111. Carroll, supra note 97, at 1424; see also John Golden, Principles for
Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 563 (2010) (defining administrability as
establishing a regime “that government actors can readily apply and that
interested private actors can readily heed, use, and understand”).
112. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).
113. Id. § 101.
114. Though it is a less critical point, it is also worth noting that all academic
literature, including presumably, literature in the humanities, arts, natural
sciences, social sciences, and professional training, has not been substantially
affected by the serials crisis. In this sense, the scope of Shavell’s approach is
somewhat over-broad. For example, literary magazines and many specialized
journals in the humanities in which academic authors publish are priced quite
modestly and are not generally thought to suffer from the inflationary
tendencies of scientific journals.
115. The exemption for copyright protection in the work product of U.S.
federal employees does not apply to state and local government employees or
employees of foreign governments. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).
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mention part-time academic authors such as adjunct
professors, instructors, lecturers and postdoctoral fellows, or
full-time members of the academic community who are not
normally considered to be academic faculty: graduate
students, project managers, and technicians. Is Shavell’s
proposal to abolish copyright dependent on the employer of
the author, the nature of the author’s engagement with an
academic institution, or the type of work being published? If
the former, then significant inconsistencies would arise in the
many scientific journals that carry articles by both academics
and non-academics (i.e., some articles would be copyrighted,
others not). If the latter, it is not clear that the arguments
regarding the rationale for abolishing copyright for academics
apply equally persuasively to non-academic authors.
Moreover, it is difficult to conceptualize a justifiable subject
matter-based exclusion from copyright that would accomplish
the goal of alleviating the serials crisis without being stated
so broadly that it would also eliminate copyright on
textbooks, technical manuals, industry standards, and other
technical works that may be more deserving of copyright
protection. Thus, it is not clear that Shavell’s proposal offers
a solid basis for differentiating between protected and
unprotected content that “the law can adequately
delineate,”116 and thus suffers from likely difficulties in
administrability.
3. Political Economy
The third prong of Carroll’s tailoring framework requires
an assessment of the political economy of a tailoring
proposal.117 As any alteration to the scope of copyright
protection is likely to require an amendment to the Copyright
Act, Shavell proposes Congressional action to address the
uniformity cost of academic publishing.118 The Copyright Act
has, of course, been amended many times, and many of these
amendments have been made with the purpose of tailoring
protection for one specific industry or another.119 Such
116. Carroll, supra note 97, at 1425.
117. Id. at 1406–07.
118. Shavell, supra note 56, at 339.
119. The Patent Act has been subject to similar industry-specific tailoring
initiatives. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 102, at 95–96.
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legislative initiatives include protections for the cable and
satellite television industries (sections 111 and 119), the
digital music industry (section 114), and visual artists
(section 1064).120
However, unlike most previous amendments to the
Copyright Act, Shavell’s proposal would act to reduce the
term of copyright protection rather than increase it. He
reasons that “[e]liminating academic copyright seems feasible
from a political perspective because of its likely endorsement
by universities, academics, and students.”121 While it is
indeed conceivable that a coalition of universities, academics
and students might support the abolition of academic
copyright (except, possibly, in the case of university press
publications), the effectiveness of such coalitions has been
limited in cases involving copyright term length.
For
example, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the petitioners (Eldred, et al.)
were joined by amici curiae including fifteen library
associations, five arts-based academic associations, seventeen
economists, five constitutional law professors, fifty-three
intellectual property law professors, and numerous other
groups. This broad-based coalition was unsuccessful in
persuading the Court and, evidently, in influencing Congress
with respect to the enactment of the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act the year before (which passed in the
House by a comfortable margin and the Senate by unanimous
consent).122
While Shavell acknowledges that political opposition to
his proposal would likely be raised by commercial publishers,
he only mentions in passing potential opposition from other
parties that “would view the abolition of academic copyright
as undesirable because it might lead to erosion of intellectual
Based on the
property rights in a wider domain.”123
enactment within the last decade and a half of the strongly
pro-copyright Sonny Bono Act, Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA),124 and Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
(1998).

17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119, 114, 106(4) (2006).
Shavell, supra note 56, at 340.
See 144 CONG. REC. H24339 (1998).
Shavell, supra note 56, at 341.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860
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(ACTA),125 it would appear that the pro-copyright lobby in the
United States is both formidable and effective.126 Thus, there
is some doubt regarding the likelihood that Congress could be
persuaded to abolish copyright in academic works in the
current political environment.127
There are additional political impediments to the
legislative amendment that Shavell proposes.
He only
mentions in passing that the abolition of academic copyright
could conflict with U.S. treaty obligations.128 The so-called
TRIPS Agreement129 establishes minimum requirements for
intellectual property protection among WTO member states.
With respect to copyright, the TRIPS Agreement requires
members to abide by Articles 1–21 of the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971),130
another treaty to which the United States is a party. Article
2(1) of the Berne Convention expressly includes within the
scope of copyright “every production in the literary, scientific
and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its
expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings,
lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same
While certain exceptions from the scope of
nature.”131
protection are permitted under the TRIPS Agreement, these
may only be imposed in “special cases.”132 And Article 9 of the
TRIPS Agreement requires that parties adopt the Berne
125. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (Oct. 1, 2011), available at http://
www.ustr.gov/acta.
126. The recent popular opposition to the pending copyright bills SOPA and
PIPA was fueled primarily by the technology sector, an increasingly powerful
foil to the pro-copyright content industries. Unfortunately, it is hard to envision
technology vendors expending significant political capital supporting the
abolition of academic copyright.
127. This is not to say, however, that no legislative action in the area of
scientific publishing is possible. See infra Part IV discussing the NIH OA Policy
and related legislation.
128. Shavell, supra note 56, at 339 n.82.
129. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm3_e.htm#1
[hereinafter
TRIPS
Agreement].
130. Id. at art. 9.
131. Berne Convention for the Protection for Literary and Artistic Works art.
2, § 1, Sept. 9, 1886, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/
trtdocs_wo001.html (enacted in the United States in 1989).
132. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 129, at art. 13.
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Convention’s minimum copyright term for protected works,
the life of the author plus fifty years.133 Thus, it is likely that
one could raise a serious challenge to the abolition of
copyright for academic works on the basis of the United
States’ obligations under both the TRIPS Agreement and the
Berne Convention.134
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, in June 2003,
Representative Martin Sabo (D-Minn) introduced a bill to the
House that would have had an effect similar to Shavell’s
proposal, though only with respect to federally-funded
research. Representative Sabo’s Public Access to Science Act
(H.R. 2613) would have amended section 105 of the Copyright
Act to provide that “Copyright protection . . . is not available
for any work produced pursuant to scientific research
substantially funded by the Federal Government.”135 The bill,
which had three co-sponsors, was referred to the House
Judiciary Committee but failed to exit committee.136
Lemley and Burk, recognizing the difficulty of enacting
effective legislative changes, suggest that tailoring of
intellectual property rights (specifically patents) may best be
achieved through judicial action.137 While Carroll is less
pessimistic about the potential for legislative tailoring
solutions, he too acknowledges that achieving lasting
efficiency gains through legislative enactments is
In the case of abolishing copyright for
challenging.138
academic works, the legislative hurdles seem particularly
high.
Based on the foregoing, under all three prongs of
Carroll’s framework for analyzing the tailoring of intellectual
133. Id. at art. 9; Berne Convention, supra note 131, at art. 7, § 1.
134. Burk and Lemley acknowledge this potential barrier to legislative
tailoring in the context of patents. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 102, at 97.
135. Public Access to Science Act, H.R. 2613, 108th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (June 26,
2003).
136. While the Public Access to Science Bill was ultimately unsuccessful, it
was succeeded in 2004 by the Congressional directive responsible for the NIH
OA Policy discussed in Part IV below. That legislation, unlike the Public Access
to Science Bill, did not abolish copyright in federally-funded scientific works,
but encouraged (and later required) their release on an open access basis
following the expiration of an exclusivity period negotiated by publishers. See
infra Part IV.A.
137. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 102, at 104–06.
138. Carroll, supra note 97, at 1432.
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property rights, Shavell’s proposal to abolish copyright in
academic works appears to face significant practical,
administrative, and political challenges.
III. RESPONSES IN THE SHADOW OF COPYRIGHT: THE OPEN
ACCESS MOVEMENT
Whatever the theoretical merits of abolishing academic
copyright may be, no such proposals have yet gained serious
traction among lawmakers or other major stakeholder groups.
In contrast, as discussed in this Section, the open access
(OA)139 movement among academic scholars and librarians
has had a significant and growing impact on the public
availability of scientific literature.
A. The Rise of Open Access
The emergence of the open access movement in scientific
publishing is often linked to the rise of the Internet in the
early- to mid-1990s, when it became increasingly clear that
research publications could be shared online with minimal
cost and great speed. In 2000, Harold Varmus, the Nobel
Prize winning Director of the U.S. National Cancer Institute,
and other prominent scientists formed the Public Library of
Science (PLoS), a coalition dedicated to improving public
access to biomedical literature.140 They circulated an open
letter, which was eventually signed by 34,000 scientists in
180 countries, urging publishers to make “the full contents of
the published record of research and scholarly discourse in
medicine and the life sciences” available to the public within
six months after initial publication.141 The OA movement
continued to gain momentum in 2001, when a group
139. The term open access generally connotes a system in which content
(typically scientific literature) is made freely available to readers. A set of
formal characteristics of open access publishing were developed at a 2003
meeting held at Howard Hughes Medical Institute in Bethesda, Maryland. See
Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing (June 20, 2003),
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/bethesda.htm.
Since then, numerous
publishing models have emerged under the broad rubric of open access. See
generally W ILLINSKY , supra note 21, at app. A (describing ten flavors of open
access).
140. Early History, PLOS, http://www.plos.org/about/what-is-plos/earlyhistory/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
141. Id. (containing the text of the PLoS 2001 letter).
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sponsored by George Soros’s Open Society Institute met in
Budapest to develop a set of recommendations for expanding
open access to peer-reviewed scientific literature.
The
resulting Budapest Initiative (released in February 2002)
calls both for self-archiving of journal articles by academic
scholars and a new generation of open access journals that
would be disseminated as widely as possible.142 Similar
statements followed from Bethesda, Maryland (June 2003)143
and Berlin (Oct. 2003).144 These calls for open access have
given rise to a number of distinct OA approaches over the
past decade. Below is a brief summary of the principal modes
of open access publication for scientific literature.
B. Modes of Open Access Publication
1. Self-Archiving—The Green Route
Many academic researchers post copies of their work on
departmental or institutional web pages, making them
available to all without charge. This practice has been
termed self-archiving or the Green route to open access. One
recent study found that in 2008, approximately twelve
percent of the published scientific literature was available
through Green open access archives.145 While this figure
demonstrates that impressive gains have been made over the
past decade, self-archived literature is still a relatively small
percentage of the overall body of scientific literature.
Though self-archiving enjoys the twin virtues of
convenience and speed, it is not without its limitations. Most
notably, it depends heavily on the technical capabilities and
142. See Read the Budapest Open Access Initiative, BUDAPEST OPEN ACCESS
INITIATIVE, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/openaccess/read (last visited
May 3, 2013).
143. Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing, supra note 139
(offering concrete steps that scientists, publishers, libraries and funding
agencies can take to “promote the rapid and efficient transition to open access
publishing”).
144. Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences
and Humanities, Oct. 22, 2003, available at http://oa.mpg.de/berlinprozess/berliner-erklarung/ (offering several conditions and definitions further
elaborating the path toward establishment of an open access regime in scientific
publishing).
145. Bo-Christer Björk et al., Open Access to the Scientific Journal Literature:
Situation 2009, 5 PLoS ONE 6 (2010).
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idiosyncrasies of the author’s home institution, lacks indexing
across different institutional repositories, and becomes
unstable when authors move from one institution to another.
To address these issues, some disciplines have moved toward
centralized archiving services such as arXiv.org (physics and
mathematics) and SSRN (social sciences, economics and law).
These services generally allow free submission of articles,
some limited indexing, and free access to all users. They are
typically supported by volunteer efforts, institutional grants
and/or charitable contributions.
In addition, numerous
software tools now exist to enable self-archiving and metatagging of documents so that they can be easily searched and
indexed.146
From a copyright standpoint, before an author enters into
a publishing contract with a journal, he or she is free to selfarchive drafts and working papers as he or she wishes. But
once an article is accepted by a journal and the author
assigns the copyright to the publisher, the publisher obtains
the exclusive right to control distribution of that work. Thus,
the author who wishes to post a copy of a published article on
his or her institutional web site cannot do so without the
permission of the publisher.
In response to this situation, a number of prominent
research universities, in conjunction with groups such as the
Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL) and the
Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition
(SPARC), began in 2005 to encourage researchers to utilize
so-called author addenda in their publishing contracts.147
Among other things, author addenda reserve the author’s
right to self-archive pre-publication versions of articles
Large institutions that
following journal publication.148
subscribe to numerous research publications have proven to
possess sufficient bargaining leverage to persuade publishers
to permit such archiving by their faculty, often after the
146. W ILLINSKY , supra note 21, at app. F.
147. See SPARC, Author Rights: Using the SPARC Author Addendum to
Secure Your Rights as the Author of a Journal Article (2006), available at
http://www.arl.org/sparc/author/addendum.shtml.
148. Archived pre-publication versions of articles are typically either preprint (articles that have not yet been accepted by a journal) or post-print (the
final manuscript after peer review and acceptance for publication, but prior to
the publisher’s copy editing, design, formatting and other services).
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expiration of an embargo period of six to twelve months, and
self-archiving of pre-print versions of articles after the
expiration of an agreed embargo period is now permitted by a
growing number of commercial publishers.149 But, as several
commentators have pointed out, a pre-print version of an
article cannot substitute for the final published article, as it
cannot be cited or quoted authoritatively, nor would it always
reflect the refinements and corrections introduced by a
journal’s peer reviewers.150
Green OA offers a convenient and inexpensive way to
disseminate research literature to a large audience.
However, it is unlikely that self-archiving can ever replace
the selection, editing, and reputational functions provided by
third party journals.
2. Open Access Journals—The Gold Route
Self-archiving is, among other things, designed to
mitigate the copyright-based access limitations imposed by
proprietary journals. An alternative OA approach seeks to
bypass limited-access journals altogether and make published
literature open from the outset.151 This approach is enabled
by a relatively new category of OA journals that support
themselves not by charging subscription or access fees to
149. The RoMEO database hosted by University of Nottingham currently
lists 217 publishers that automatically allow institutional self-archiving of
articles and fifty-eight more that allow self-archiving after the expiration of an
embargo period. Publishers Allowing the Deposition of their Published
Version/PDF in Institutional Repositories, S HERPA/ROMEO, http://
www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/PDFandIR.php?la=en (last updated Apr. 22, 2013).
150. See, e.g., Michael Jubb, Correspondence—Open Access: Let’s Go for Gold,
487 NATURE 302 (2012); Shavell, supra note 56, at 332. The same observation
applies to conference presentations, posters and abstracts. While valuable
scientific information is undoubtedly disseminated through these channels,
often long before results appear in a published article, only the definitive,
published article is typically cited in another scientific article or grant
application.
151. In the strictest sense of open access, journals should permit free online
access to content without any restrictions on reuse (provided that users cite the
original author and publisher on copies and derivatives of the content). Michael
Carroll has recently noted that “some publications have begun offering an openaccess option that charges for Internet publication without granting readers full
reuse rights.” Michael W. Carroll, Why Full Open Access Matters, 9 PLOS
BIOLOGY 1 (2011). Carroll argues that this pseudo open access approach
violates both the spirit and the purpose of open access publication and fails to
produce the benefits that full open access can provide.
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readers, but by charging the authors who publish in them.
This model has become known as the author-pays or Gold
route to open access.152 For-profit publisher BioMed Central
introduced the first significant Gold OA publishing venue in
2000.
Today, BioMed Central is part of the Springer
publishing group and publishes more than 220 OA journals in
all fields of biomedical science.153 In 2003, the Public Library
of Science (PLoS) launched its first open access journal, PLoS
Biology, with financial backing from the Gordon and Betty
Since then, PLoS has achieved
Moore Foundation.154
significant recognition and its flagship journal, PLoS ONE,
published 6749 papers in 2010, more than any other scientific
journal.155
Author publication fees for Gold OA journals generally
range from $1000 to $5000 per article, but can reach $10,000
or more in some cases.156 While the researcher’s institution is
generally responsible for the payment of these fees, an
increasing number of funding agencies and foundations have
152. Some advocates of Gold OA argue that only a minority of open access
journals charge author fees. See, e.g., Peter Suber, Open Access Overview,
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/overview.htm (last updated Apr. 2, 2013)
(reporting that seventy percent of Gold OA journals charge no author-side fees).
Presumably, many of the non-charging Gold OA journals either receive funding
from institutional or governmental sources or rely exclusively on volunteer
efforts. Such approaches are not likely both to produce high-quality work and
remain viable over the long term. Thus, for purposes of this Article, I follow the
custom of equating Gold OA approaches with the author-pays model. See
McCabe & Snyder, supra note 23.
By the same token, many professional societies (such as the American
Physiological Society) charge authors publication fees in order to defray member
subscription costs. See Dale J. Benos, L. Gabriel Navar & Margaret Reich,
Publishing in the Journals of the APS: Why are Authors Charged Fees?, 278 AM.
J. PHYSIOLOGY GASTROINTESTINAL LIVER PHYSIOLOGY 663, 663 (2000) (“Like
many other association publishers, APS is able to keep subscription prices low
by sharing some of the cost of publishing the journals with the authors who
submit manuscripts. . . . Many commercial publishers do not charge authors for
publication (i.e., page charges) but have much higher subscription prices.”); see
also Information for Authors—Submission Guidelines, PROCEEDINGS NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCIS., http://www.pnas.org/site/authors/fees.xhtml (last visited May 3,
2013) (detailing fees per page and per color figure); Instructions to Authors, J.
VIROLOGY, http://jvi.asm.org/misc/journal-ita_pub.dtl (last updated Apr. 2013)
(detailing fees per page and per color figure).
153. See Journals A–Z, BIOMED CENTRAL: THE OPEN ACCESS PUBLISHER,
http://www.biomedcentral.com/ (last visited May 3, 2013).
154. Early History, supra note 140.
155. John Whitfield, Open Access Comes of Age, 474 NATURE 428 (2011).
156. Maria Leptin, Open Access—Pass the Buck, 335 SCIENCE 1279 (2012).
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indicated a willingness to pay author publication fees for
research that they fund.157 In addition, such fees are often
waived or heavily discounted for researchers in developing
countries.158
The growth of Gold OA journals over the past decade has
been steady and is showing signs of achieving financial
sustainability. One study found that in 2009 nearly 200,000
peer-reviewed articles were published in 4769 Gold OA
journals, representing between six and eight percent of the
total peer-reviewed scientific literature published that year.159
Thus, while Gold OA journals have seen impressive gains in
just a decade, the large majority of peer-reviewed scientific
output continues to be published in commercial, limitedaccess journals; and some critics question whether Gold OA
journals will ever achieve a significant market share.160
Among the challenges such journals face are their current
lack of prestige as compared to many traditional journals,
which dissuades scientists from submitting their best work to
them.161 Moreover, until such time as a large segment of the

157. Declan Butler, US Seeks to Make Science Free for All, 464 NATURE 822,
823 (2010). A group of major research universities including Harvard, M.I.T.,
Dartmouth, Cornell, Berkeley, Columbia, Memorial Sloan-Kettering and the
University of Ottawa have formed a group called the Compact for Open-Access
Publishing Equity to advocate for greater payment of open access publication
fees by research funders. Compact for Open-Access Publishing Equity,
http://www.oacompact.org/compact/ (last visited May 3, 2013).
158. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Open Access Scientific Publishing and
the Developing World, 8 ST. ANTONY’S INT’L REV. 43, 53–55 (2012) (discussing
information philanthropy in the developing world).
159. Mikael Laaski et al., The Development of Open Access Journal
Publishing from 1993 to 2009, 6 PLoS ONE 1 (2011). Significantly higher
figures for OA journals are reflected in the online Directory of Open Access
Journals, which, as of this writing, lists more than 7300 OA journals in 117
countries. Directory of Open Access Journals, www.doaj.org (last visited May 3,
2013). However, these figures rely on self-reporting, do not account for
discontinued or merged journals, and do not required that journals be peer
reviewed in order to be included. Shavell places the percentage of Gold OA
journals in 2009 at four percent. Shavell, supra note 86, at 333.
160. See Shavell, supra note 56, at 333–35.
161. Shavell views this lack of prestige as the most serious challenge faced by
OA journals, though he also expects that the quality gap between traditional
and OA journals may diminish over time. Shavell, supra note 56, at 334. This
issue is exacerbated for OA journals as a result of the growing number of
predatory and counterfeit journals that have emerged to lure unsuspecting
authors to publish and then demand previously undisclosed publication fees.

3_CONTRERAS FINAL.DOC

2013]

7/23/2013 9:25 PM

THE CRISIS IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING

531

market consists of author-pays journals,162 Gold OA journals
will compete for authors and content with traditional journals
that charge authors nothing. The marketplace is further
complicated by the emergence of questionable operators who
appear to create new low-quality journals solely to attract
author fees and provide few of the benefits of legitimate Gold
OA journals.163 Thus, in the marketplace for new articles,
Gold OA journals will continue to suffer a competitive
disadvantage to traditional, established reader-pays journals.
This situation will continue to be the case even if funders
permit grant funding to be used to defray author-side
publication fees, as some level of effort will always be
required on the author’s part to secure this funding, and in an
era of declining grant funding, a few thousand dollars per
article in publication fees can always find other productive
uses.164 Finally, it is still unclear whether an author-pays
Gold OA model is financially viable across a large field of
competitors. Many of the major Gold OA initiatives operating
today have received substantial supplemental funding from
charitable sources165 or are part of larger profit-making
organizations (e.g., BioMed Central, the OA arm of Springer).
Such non-recurring revenue and support, while helpful to the
initial entrants to the Gold OA marketplace, may not be
available to subsequent entrants, raising questions regarding
the scalability of the model.166
162. This is the situation that Shavell would bring about with the abolition of
academic copyright.
163. See Declan Butler, The Dark Side of Publishing, 495 NATURE 433
(2013); Jeffrey Beall, Predatory Publishers are Corrupting Open Access, 489
NATURE 179 (2012); Martin Enserink, As Open Access Explodes, How to Tell the
Good From the Bad and the Ugly?, 338 SCIENCE 1018 (2012).
164. Moreover, it is often the case that only a project’s principal investigator
has access to grant funding for publication fees, and not post-doctoral fellows or
graduate students and publication often occurs months or years after the
expiration of the grant funding. (I am grateful to Monte Buschbaum for these
insights).
165. For example, in 2004 PLoS reported that ninety percent of its revenue
derived from contributions and grants. By 2009, eighty-nine percent of its
revenue was earned from author fees. Dorsey et al., supra note 47, at 257.
166. One recent analysis conducted by the U.K. government found that
depending on starting assumptions about author fee levels and international
uptake of Gold OA journals, a transition of U.K. research publications to a fully
Gold-OA model could cost the U.K. higher education sector anything from zero
to £70 million per year. Editorial—Openness Costs, 486 NATURE 439 (2012)
(citing W ORKING GROUP ON EXPANDING ACCESS TO PUBLISHED RESEARCH
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3. Voluntary Time-Delayed Open Access
Scientific publishers have not uniformly opposed open
access initiatives, and a few have even embraced them.
Learned societies still publish a number of important
scientific journals, and these have been among the most
receptive to OA publishing models due, in large part, to
advocacy by their members. Examples include the New
England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) (published by the
Massachusetts Medical Society) and Molecular Biology of the
Cell (MBC) (published by the American Society for Cell
Biology). Each of these journals now voluntarily makes its
contents publicly available after a waiting period (six months
in the case of NEJM, two months in the case of MBC).167 All
seventeen journals published by the American Physiological
Society make their contents openly available after twelve
months.168 The theory behind such delayed-release programs
is presumably that dues-paying members of the society
benefit from immediate access to journal content, and are not
harmed by the eventual public availability of such content.
Though promising, such delayed-release programs are
limited primarily to journals published by learned societies
rather than commercial publishers. Societies, in contrast to
commercial publishers, serve their members through multiple
channels, of which journal publication is only one. As of 2006,
however, the three largest commercial publishers of scientific
journals collectively controlled sixty percent of scientific
research content, and have significant subscription and
reprint revenues at stake.169 These organizations have not,
by and large, engaged in large-scale adoption of open access
models, and some commentators do not see such a shift as
likely170 (the notable exception being Springer’s acquisition in
2008 of BioMed Central, the largest Gold OA publisher).

FINDINGS , ACCESSIBILITY , S USTAINABILITY , EXCELLENCE : HOW TO EXPAND
ACCESS TO RESEARCH P UBLICATIONS (2012)).
167. WILLINSKY, supra note 21, at 6, 63.
168. John Willinsky, The Publisher’s Pushback Against NIH’s Public Access
and Scholarly Publishing Sustainability, 7 PLOS BIOLOGY 20, 21 (2009).
169. See id. at 18.
170. See McCabe & Snyder, supra note 23, at 3–4.
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4. Institutional Open Access Mandates
Both Green and Gold routes to open access are largely
voluntary. That is, authors choose to make their work openly
accessible, either by self-archiving or submitting it to an OA
journal. As demonstrated by the relatively modest proportion
of articles available through self-archiving sites, scientists
have little incentive to incur the cost and effort to selfarchive.171 Beginning in 2008, however, several prominent
research universities including Harvard, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and University College London,
began to implement policies arising from their frustration
with commercial publishers’ unwillingness to allow selfarchiving of their faculty authors’ published articles.172 These
policies typically mandate that faculty deposit all research
publications into open access databases after the passage of
some defined time period following publication.173 Such
mandates give researchers a strong incentive to submit their
work to journals that permit self-archiving or other open
access release, and by the same token encourage commercial
journals to permit this form of open access. By the end of
2011, more than 150 institutions worldwide had implemented
such mandatory open access policies for scholarly
publications.174 In many cases, the use of time delays before
published content is granted open access status has served to
facilitate negotiation and agreement regarding this difficult
171. This effort would include, in addition to whatever work were required to
post the article online, an often-frustrating exchange with the publisher
securing permission to self-archive.
172. For an extensive analysis of Harvard’s open access mandate, and a
discussion of the distinction between deposit mandates (in which university
faculty are simply required to deposit their published work into OA repositories)
and permission mandates (in which the university purports to reserve to itself
the right to publish all works produced by its faculty), see Priest, supra note 72
(questioning the legal enforceability of university permission mandates under
copyright law); see also John Timmer, MIT to Make All Faculty Publications
Open Access, ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 24, 2009, http://arstechnica.com
/science/2009/03/mit-to-make-all-faculty-publications-open-access/; Open-Access
Publishing Gains Another Convert, 459 N ATURE 627 (2009).
173. Many of these mandates, however, also permit authors to opt out of the
open access requirement on a case-by-case basis. See Priest, supra note 72, at
377–78.
174. ROARMAP: Registry of Open Access Repositories Mandatory
Archiving Policies, ROARMAP, http://roarmap.eprints.org/ (last visited Apr.
26, 2013).
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issue.175
However, such initiatives have generally been limited to
large and influential research institutions whose faculty may
be less vulnerable to retaliation (or the fear of retaliation) by
journals.
Smaller institutions might be reluctant to
jeopardize the publication options of their faculty by imposing
such mandates. Moreover, the results of such bilateral
negotiations are usually protected by confidentiality clauses,
making the benchmarking of such agreements difficult for
those wishing to negotiate with publishers.
IV. FROM MOVEMENT TO MANDATE
A. Funder and Agency Open Access Mandates
The preceding Section describes a number of privatelyordered open access initiatives developed by research
institutions, scientists and publishers to counteract the
effects of the serials crisis in scientific publishing. During the
period that these initiatives were being implemented, many
of the leaders of the open access movement were also urging
major research funders, both governmental and charitable, to
take similar steps toward encouraging the broad public
availability of scientific literature.176
This call was soon answered by major private research
foundations including the Wellcome Trust in the United
Kingdom, and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute and the
MacArthur Foundation in the United States. Each of these
organizations now requires that all researchers to whom it
provides financial support must deposit any resulting journal
Like the
articles into an open access repository.177
institutional mandates described in Part III.B.4 above, these
175. See Jorge L. Contreras, Data Sharing, Latency Variables and Science
Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1601 (2010) (discussing negotiation of
timing periods in this and other multi-stakeholder contexts).
176. In fact, many of these leaders themselves held government office. The
primary example of this close connection between the OA movement and
government is Harold Varmus, co-founder of PLoS, who has served as Director
of both the National Institutes of Health and the National Cancer Institute (the
position in which he currently serves).
177. See, e.g., HAROLD VARMUS, THE ART AND POLITICS OF SCIENCE 265–66
(2009); Patricia Renfro, Open Access Within Reach: An Agenda for Action, 51 J.
LIBRARY ADMIN. 464, 465 (2011).
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policies encourage researchers to submit their papers to
journals that permit some form of open access release, and
also encourage commercial publishers to permit self-archiving
of these articles within some time period following initial
publication.
Beginning in 2003, scientists, archivists, and policy
makers also began to approach U.S. and European
governmental funding agencies regarding the need for open
access to scientific publications.178 In the case of government
agencies, open access advocates had available to them an
additional argument not germane to the private sector: that it
is inappropriate for research funded by the taxpayers to inure
solely to the financial benefit of publishers.179 Their strong
contention was that taxpayer-funded research should be
made freely-available, both to scientists and to the general
public.180 The implications of this argument are significant,
as government-funded scientific research represents a large
portion of all academic research conducted globally.181
According to one estimate, research funded by the U.S.
National Institutes of Health (NIH) alone, which has an
annual research funding budget of more than $30 billion,
results in approximately 60,000 new scientific papers every
year.182
Both NIH and Congress were highly receptive to this
argument.
Accordingly, in July 2004, the House
Appropriations Committee directed NIH to ensure that all
scientific publications generated by NIH-funded research be
made available online.183 Shortly thereafter NIH engaged in
an informal rulemaking procedure and public comment

178. See WILLINSKY , supra note 21, at 1.
179. Id. at 1–3.
180. The patient advocacy community has forcefully argued that access to the
latest research contained in medical journals is of critical importance to
patients and their families and caregivers.
181. See AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., AAAS REPORT XXXVI—
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FY 2012, at 12 (2012) (reporting that U.S.
federal agencies fund approximately sixty percent of academic research and
development).
182. W ILLINSKY , supra note 21, at 2.
183. MICHAEL W. CARROLL , COMPLYING WITH THE N ATIONAL INSTITUTES
OF H EALTH P UBLIC A CCESS POLICY : COPYRIGHT C ONSIDERATIONS AND
OPTIONS 2 (2008).
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solicitation.184
During the comment period, the agency
received more than 1000 responses, including significant
opposition from publishers and representatives of other
content-based industries.
After considering this public
response, NIH adopted a new policy185 that encouraged, but
did not require, researchers to place the full text of their
published articles into the National Library of Medicine’s
publicly-accessible PubMed Central archive186 within six
months following publication in a journal.
But with little direct incentive to do so, and the prospect
of having to negotiate nettlesome publication addenda with
publishers who were unfamiliar with (or hostile to) the NIH
policy, scientists did not submit their articles to PubMed
Central in large quantities.187 Advocates again approached
Congress regarding the need for access to taxpayer-funded
research. Accordingly, in 2007 Congress directed NIH to
revise its policy to require open access publication of NIHfunded publications.188
The revised NIH policy189 (the NIH OA Policy) went into
effect in 2008. It provides that all publications resulting from
NIH-funded research must be uploaded to PubMed Central
within one year of publication.190 The NIH OA Policy has
184. N AT ’L INSTS . OF HEALTH, ENHANCED P UBLIC ACCESS TO NIH
RESEARCH I NFORMATION, Public Notice NOT-OD-04-064, (Sept. 3, 2004),
available
at
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-04064.html. For a more detailed discussion of this process, see CARROLL , supra
note 183, at 2.
185. NAT ’L INSTS . OF H EALTH, POLICY ON ENHANCING P UBLIC ACCESS TO
ARCHIVED P UBLICATIONS RESULTING FROM THE NIH-F UNDED RESEARCH,
Public Notice NOT-OD-05-022 (Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://
grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-05-022.html.
186. PMC, NCBI, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ (last visited Apr. 26,
2013).
187. According to a 2006 NIH progress report, the compliance rate with
NIH’s voluntary policy was 3.8%. Peter Suber, NIH Report to Congress, OPEN
ACCESS N EWS (Feb. 16, 2006), http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/2006/02/nihreport-to-congress.html.
188. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, PL 110–161, tit. II, § 218 (Dec.
26, 2007).
189. NAT ’L INSTS . OF HEALTH, R EVISED POLICY ON ENHANCING P UBLIC
ACCESS TO ARCHIVED PUBLICATIONS RESULTING FROM NIH-F UNDED
RESEARCH, Public Notice NOT-OD-08-033 (Apr. 7, 2008) (implementing
Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 188).
190. Note the lengthening of the latency period from six months under the
2005 policy to twelve months under the 2008 mandatory policy, largely due to
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already had a significant impact on the availability of
biomedical literature: as of the end of 2011 the PubMed
Central repository held approximately 2.3 million published
articles relating to the biomedical sciences.
The NIH OA Policy has likely been successful because it
balances the interests of publishers, scientists, and the public.
Thus, even though published articles are made publiclyavailable one year after initial publication, enough
institutions seem to be willing to pay for immediate access
that journals can continue to charge subscription fees and
recoup their costs plus some profit during the one-year
exclusivity period. The continued high profit margins of the
leading scientific publishers suggests that NIH’s policy has
not significantly reduced subscriptions to commercial
journals,191 nor have any discernible number of commercial
journals gone out of business as a result of their inability to
charge for access to articles after they have been placed in
PubMed Central.
Similar open access mandates have been enacted by the
European Research Council, the UK Medical Research
Council, and numerous other non-U.S. funding agencies. The
NIH OA Policy has also been viewed with approval by other
agencies within the U.S. federal government, and in 2010 and
2012 bills were introduced in the House of Representatives
that would have required all other federal research funding
agencies to adopt a similar policy.192 Most recently, the U.S.
Office of Science and Technology Policy issued a
Memorandum directing all federal agencies with research
budgets of more than $100 million to develop a plan for
providing increased public access to the results of federallyfunded research along the lines of the NIH OA Policy.193
the agency’s attempt to respond to public comments received from the
publishing industry.
191. See Dorsey et al., supra note 47, at fig.2.
192. Federal Research Public Access Act of 2012, H.R. 4004, 112th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2012); Federal Research Public Access Act of 2009, H.R. 5037, 111th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2010). Companion legislation was introduced in the Senate by
Senators Cornyn, Wyden and Hutchison. Federal Research Public Access Act of
2012, S. 2096, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012).
193. JOHN P. HOLDREN, DIRECTOR – OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECH. POL.,
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
(Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp
/ostp_public_access_memo_2013.pdf (also requiring Federal agencies to develop
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B. Vulnerabilities of Agency Mandates
Despite the apparent success and promise of agency
mandates, there are at least three significant issues that may
limit their effectiveness as long-term solutions to the
scientific publishing crisis.
1. National Open Access?
The principal argument made in support of agency open
access mandates is that taxpayer-funded research should not
redound solely to the financial benefit of private commercial
publishers, but rather should be made available to the
taxpayers who funded it. Doing otherwise requires the
taxpayer to pay twice for the same goods: the first time
through his taxes, and the second time through the
subscription fees charged by publishers. As described by Rep.
Mike Doyle when introducing legislation this year to expand
the scope of the NIH OA Policy, “Americans have the right to
see the results of research funded with taxpayer dollars.”194
This argument is attractive for its rhetorical simplicity
and its appeal to a populist sentiment that is currently in
vogue.195 It has also been relatively successful in marshaling
an approach for optimizing search, archiving and dissemination of research
publications). The OSTP Memorandum directs Federal agencies to use "a
twelve-month post-publication embargo period as a guideline for making
research papers publicly available", though periods of different lengths may be
acceptable depending on agency circumstances. Id. at 3. Calls have already
been made to shorten this period to six months. Comments of Michael Carroll,
Public Access to Federally-Supported Research and Development Data and
Publications: Publications, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (May 14, 2013)
available
at
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/DBASSE/DBASSE_083052
#.UZKXPsocOuM. The political will to act in this area may have been
supplemented by a grassroots petition launched on the White House’s open
government web site in May 2012 which received nearly 30,000 signatures. See
Require Free Access Over the Internet to Scientific Journal Articles Arising
from Taxpayer-Funded Research, W E THE P EOPLE: YOUR VOICE IN O UR
GOVERNMENT (May 13, 2012), https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition
/require-free-access-over-internet-scientific-journal-articles-arising-taxpayerfunded-research/wDX82FLQ.
194. Doyle Introduces Bill to Ensure Public Access to Federally-Funded
Research, U.S. CONGRESSMAN MIKE DOYLE (Feb. 9, 2012), http://
doyle.house.gov/press-release/doyle-introduces-bill-ensure-public-accessfederally-funded-research.
195. The argument suffers from some obvious logical flaws that have largely
been ignored. For example, U.S. taxpayers also pay for nuclear weapons, Air
Force One, federal courthouses, penitentiaries and containers of grain shipped
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support for the NIH OA Policy. However, the taxpayer
argument introduces into the open access debate a national
character that has not previously been present.
The national character of research funding is one of the
seldom-discussed puzzles of the open access model.
Proponents of open access to scientific literature generally
advocate global open access. That is, literature that is
considered open access should be available to any reader
throughout the world without charge.196 This model reflects
the global, open nature of the Internet (national censorship
notwithstanding), and has generally been adopted by open
access publications and resources across the board, including
PubMed Central.197 There are many valid arguments, both
ideological and instrumentalist, for adopting such a global
approach. But the argument that U.S. taxpayer-funded
research should be accessible to the taxpayers does not
support a global open access approach.
Rather, this
to developing countries, yet there is no serious argument that the average
taxpayer should be permitted to access or use these assets simply on the basis of
tax funding. In essence, the payment of taxes does not (and cannot, practically
speaking) give rise to any direct entitlement to the things that the government
spends those tax dollars to purchase.
In terms of intellectual property, the situation is more complex. Works of
authorship created by federal employees are excluded from federal copyright
protection. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006). This exclusion tends to support the
argument that federal taxpayer dollars (i.e., those paying the salaries of federal
employees) should result in work that is broadly accessible to the public. Yet
the federal copyright exclusion only applies to federal employees, and not to
federal contractors. Copyright in works produced by authors under federal
contract are generally owned by the contractor, with a limited right to
governmental use. A contrary approach has been taken in federal policy
relating to patents. Under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, the federal government
expressly authorizes government-funded researchers (principally university
laboratories) to secure patent protection for inventions made using federal
funding.
Even more puzzling is the fact that the federal government itself obtains
patent protection on inventions made by federal agency employees. Clearly, in
the case of patents, federal policy does not mandate the divestment of rights
based on the receipt federal funding. Thus, it is by no means clear that the
presence of federal funding should compel the release of scientific publications
contrary to the protections afforded by copyright law.
196. See, e.g., Read the Budapest Open Access Initiative, supra note 142
(advocating the “world-wide electronic distribution of the peer-reviewed journal
literature and completely free and unrestricted access to it by all scientists,
scholars, teachers, students, and other curious minds.”).
197. See PMC Overview, NCBI, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/about
/intro/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).

3_CONTRERAS FINAL.DOC

540

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

7/23/2013 9:25 PM

[Vol. 53

argument would tend to favor a system whereby research
publications were made accessible only to U.S. taxpayers
(institutional or individual), but not to foreign ones. Such a
nationally-based open access system (which I have termed
National OA) would, in economic terms, better allocate the
benefit of U.S. tax dollars to U.S. taxpayers, and would
eliminate economic free riding by non-U.S. consumers of
research.198 Thus, supporters of broad open access initiatives
should be wary of the taxpayer argument and its potential to
limit the scope of information availability in the future.
2. Limited Copyright Permissions
From a legal standpoint, it is important to note that
agency mandates such as the NIH OA Policy do not purport
to divest publishers of any exclusive rights under copyright
Rather, these policies require agency-funded
law.199
researchers to upload their published articles to a centralized
open access repository, but in compliance with copyright law.
For example, under the NIH OA Policy, authors are required
to deposit their published articles into the federally-managed
PubMed Central repository within one year following
publication.200 Because the publisher acquires the copyright
in the article, the author cannot make this deposit without
the publisher’s permission. Publishers, of course, would be
short-sighted in prohibiting PubMed Central deposits,
because much high-quality research in the United States is
funded by NIH. It is thus in their interest to enable authors
to comply with the NIH OA Policy.
Publishers could enable this compliance by granting
authors a copyright license to upload their articles to PubMed
Central upon expiration of the one-year holding period.
198. I address the potential for a National OA model in greater detail in:
Letter from Jorge L. Contreras to Ted Wackler, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of
Science and Technology Policy, Re: OSTP Request for Information: Public
Access to Peer-Reviewed Scholarly Publications Resulting from Federally
Funded Research (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites
/default/files/microsites/ostp/scholarly-pubs-%28%23291%29%20au-wcl.pdf.
199. Some have argued that a mandate in this form could constitute the
taking of a property right under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and thereby impose on NIH an obligation to compensate the publisher for the
fair value of the appropriated property. A full analysis of this argument is
beyond the scope of this Article.
200. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 189.
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However, most publishers have elected to take a more
circuitous route and grant the author no copyright license.
Rather, the publishers commit that they will submit the postprint version of the article to PubMed Central twelve months
after publication.201 This approach has several advantages for
the publisher: it ensures that only the post-print version, and
not the published version, of the article will be released to the
public, and it keeps the publisher’s copyright intact, without
licenses flowing to individual authors. Thus, if the NIH OA
Policy were suddenly to change or be rescinded, publishers
could rescind any rights granted to NIH and no residual
rights would remain with the authors. For the same reason,
the commitments made by publishers to authors in this
regard are highly tailored to the specific open access policies
being addressed, and some publishers maintain a separate
policy for each different funding agency that requires open
access release.202 Thus, if a particular funding agency
changed or rescinded its open access policy, any new action
required by the publisher would not affect its commitments
made with respect to other agencies.
This level of specificity, while enabling compliance with
current agency policies, is not very adaptable to changed
circumstances, requirements, or technologies.
Thus, a
publisher’s commitment to upload an article to PubMed
Central is useful while PubMed Central is in operation in its
current form. However, what would happen if PubMed
Central began to charge non-U.S. institutions for access (as it
might if a National OA program were implemented)? What if
the federal government, in a politically-motivated flurry of
governmental shrinkage, transferred PubMed Central to a
private sector entity (much as it has done with the U.S.
Postal Service)? What if Google became the primary vehicle
for scientific publishing? In very few of these cases would
publishers’ current OA commitments compel the re-posting of
201. See, e.g., GENETICS IN MEDICINE, Authorship Responsibility, Financial
Disclosure, and Copyright Transfer 3, available at http://edmgr.ovid.com/gim
/accounts/copyrightTransfer.pdf (last visited May 3, 2013).
202. See,
e.g.,
Funding
Body
Agreements,
ELSEVIER,
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/authorsview.authors/fundingbodyagreements
(last visited May 3, 2013) (providing links to Elsevier’s separate policies for
NIH, the Wellcome Trust, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, the U.K. Medical
Research Council and ten other funding bodies).
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articles to such new, altered or improved repositories, and the
2.3 million articles currently residing in PubMed Central
would be stuck there unless some actor could persuade or pay
the publishing industry to authorize this new open access
release. There are thus serious issues with the long-term
viability of governmental and other funder OA mandates.
3. Political Uncertainty
While OA mandates imposed by a non-profit funder may
remain in place so long as the funder does not radically
change its mission, mandates implemented by governmental
agencies are subject to the whim of political change. The
most successful agency mandate to-date, the NIH OA Policy,
which can already be credited with the public release of more
than 2.3 million scientific journal articles, is under continual
legal attack by the commercial publishing industry.
Legislation seeking to overturn the NIH OA Policy has been
introduced in the House of Representatives twice: in 2008203
and 2011.204 Though neither of these legislative initiatives
gained much ground, it is not difficult to envision a political
climate that would favor the elimination of costly federal
document repositories that essentially duplicate and
supersede the work of private sector enterprises.205 And even
if legislative efforts are unsuccessful in revoking such
policies, changes in agency leadership could have equally
damaging effects on the viability of governmental repositories
and the continuation of agency open access mandates.
V. COMMONS AND LATENCY IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING
In this Section, I view the scientific publishing market
through the lens of commons theory and compare different
publishing approaches in terms of latency, a concept relating
203. Fair Copyright in Research Works Act, H.R. 801, 111th Cong. (2009)
(prohibiting federal agencies from adopting open access publication policies).
204. Research Works Act, supra note 4 (introduced by Representatives Issa
and Maloney on Dec. 16, 2011). The bill’s co-sponsors withdrew it in February
2012. See Howard, supra note 5.
205. From a U.S. political standpoint, it is probably fortunate that the largest
scientific publishers are European (Reed Elsevier—Dutch (approximately 1800
titles), Taylor and Francis—U.K. (more than 1000 titles), and Springer—
Germany (more than 500 titles)), without a significant employment base in the
United States.
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to the delay period between the production and dissemination
of a quantum of knowledge.
A. Science Commons
The term commons has long been used to denote a
resource shared by a group of individuals, typically without
significant restriction on its use or consumption.206 In recent
years, much has been written about so-called information
commons, a term used to encompass resources as varied as
computer software, network capacity, artistic content, and
And Peter Suber has aptly applied
scientific data.207
commons terminology and theory to the corpus of scientific
literature and, in particular, that portion of the literature
that is available on an open access basis.208
In previous work, I have analyzed the effect of various
rule sets on the rate at which new information is added to
this scientific literature commons.209 A principal finding of
this work was the observation of embargo, exclusivity or
restricted periods (which I collectively refer to as latency
periods) that emerged, seemingly independently, in each of
these settings. During such latency periods, a publisher
typically retains the exclusive right to offer access to a
published work and to charge a premium for subscription
access to it. But after the expiration of the latency period, the
206. See Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, Introduction: An Overview of the
Knowledge Commons, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM
THEORY TO PRACTICE 4–5 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2006).
207. See, e.g., HAL ABELSON, KEN LEDEEN & HARRY LEWIS, BLOWN TO BITS—
YOUR LIFE, LIBERTY, AND HAPPINESS AFTER THE DIGITAL EXPLOSION 277 (2008)
(discussing the application of commons theory to broadcast spectrum); LESSIG,
supra note 86, ch. 6 (arguing that commons systems have encouraged
innovation, specifically with respect to software, telecommunications and the
Internet); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO
STOP IT 78–79 (2008) (discussing commons approaches both to Internet content
and hardware); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 379–80 (2002) (arguing that commons-based peer
production of software has proven to be both viable and efficient, as
demonstrated by the model of the Linux operating system); James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 44–49 (2003) (discussing open source software).
208. Peter Suber, Creating an Intellectual Commons through Open Access, in
UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A C OMMONS , supra note 206, at 171.
209. Jorge L. Contreras, supra note 175; Jorge L. Contreras, Prepublication
Data Release, Latency, and Genome Commons, 329 SCIENCE 393 (2010).
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work becomes available for free and open access (either by the
publisher, the author, or a third party). The policy settings
and stakeholder groups involved in these negotiations are
summarized in Table 1 below, along with the resulting
latency period established.
Table 1
Latency-Based Negotiated Compromises in Scientific
Publishing
Setting

Stakeholders

Institutional
Mandates

Universities,
Scientists, and
Commercial
Publishers
Association
Publishers and
Scientists
(Members)
Funder, Scientists,
and Commercial
Publishers
Funder, Scientists,
and Commercial
Publishers

Voluntary
Time-Delayed
OA
NIH
Voluntary OA
Policy (2005)
NIH
Mandatory
OA Policy
(2008)
Howard
Hughes
Medical
Institute
(HHMI)
Wellcome
Trust OA
policy
Proposed
Federal
Research
Public Access
Act (2010)
(not enacted)

Open
Access
Channel
Institutional
selfarchiving

Latency
Period

Publisher

2–12
months

PubMed
Central

6 months

PubMed
Central

12 months

Funder, Scientists,
and Commercial
Publishers

PubMed
Central

6 months

Funder, Scientists,
and Commercial
Publishers
U.S. Federal
Agencies, Scientists,
and Commercial
Publishers

UK PubMed
Central

6 months

n/a

6 months

6–12
months
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Setting

Stakeholders

Research
Councils
UK210

UK Government,
Scientists, and
Commercial
Publishers

OSTP
Memorandum
to Federal
Agencies
(2013)

U.S. Federal
Agencies, Scientists,
and Commercial
Publishers

Open
Access
Channel
Journal OA
site or selfarchiving

To be
determined

545

Latency
Period
Immediate
(for journal
site) or 12
months
(selfarchiving)
12 month
"guideline"

To recapitulate: (1) in bilateral negotiations, universities
and publishers have negotiated limited exclusivity periods of
six to twelve months before university researchers are
authorized to release published articles to the public, (2)
membership organizations that publish scientific journals, in
response to member demands, voluntarily permit open access
release of articles following an exclusivity period of up to
twelve months, (3) through agency notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures, NIH has mandated that all
publications arising from NIH-funded research be released to
the PubMed Central database twelve months after
publication, (4) major charitable foundations such as the
Wellcome Trust and HHMI have mandated that all
publications arising from research funded by them be
released to open access databases six months after
publication, and (5) the NIH mandate has recently been
extended to all federal agencies with a holding period to be
set on an agency-by-agency basis with a guideline of twelve
months.211
Interestingly, as Table 1 illustrates, the latency periods
that have emerged in these diverse settings are generally in
210. RESEARCH C OUNCILS UK POLICY ON ACCESS TO RESEARCH O UTPUTS
(2012),
available
at
http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/documents/documents/RCUK%20_Policy_on_
Access_to_Research_Outputs.pdf.
211. See OSTP Memorandum, supra note 193.
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the range of six to twelve months. It hardly bears mentioning
that, even at the high end, such periods are substantially
shorter than the statutory copyright term which, as discussed
in Part I above, can easily exceed a century. Though
positions regarding the optimal length of latency periods still
differ,212 it appears that the scientific community is
converging on a latency period in the range of six to twelve
months. Such convergence suggests that there are common
considerations motivating the separate negotiations213 among
the different stakeholder groups (i.e., publishers, libraries,
scientists, governmental agencies, and research institutions)
in each of these diverse contexts.214
B. Optimizing Latency
How can the observed latency convergence described in
the preceding Section be explained? From the standpoint of
publishers, any acceptable latency period must be sufficient
to enable them to recoup at least their first copy costs plus a
reasonable profit. Beyond that point, further returns are not
required to incentivize either the production or publication of
As the latency period increases,
scientific works.215
publishers are able to sell not only subscriptions, but also
reprints, thus increasing their value further. From the
standpoint of libraries, scientists, and public advocates, the
212. To be sure, some commercial publishers still argue that any latency
period is too short. This position is reflected in the recently-introduced
Research Works Act, supra note 4. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
213. I intentionally use the term negotiating to describe both private party
interactions and governmental rulemaking and legislation, which are deeply
affected by input from private interest groups. See, e.g., Jessica D. Litman,
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 870–
79 (1986) (describing the lengthy and difficult negotiations leading to the
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976).
214. It has also been suggested that the observed convergence of latency
periods around the six to twelve month range may be attributable not to any
inherent efficiency associated with this time period, but, at least in part, to
diffusion and the imitation of the negotiated results of initial actors. But even if
this were the case, there would still be great value in the establishment of a
commonly-adopted latency period.
215. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 56, at 50 (“[E]ven with regard to
expressive works especially vulnerable to being promptly and perfectly and
widely copied . . . it is unclear that manufacturers would require copyright
protection lasting more than a few years in order to be able to recover the
reasonable cost of creating the work.”).
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greatest value is derived when the latency period is the
shortest, making knowledge available for general use as soon
as possible. The longer knowledge is withheld from the
public, the less value they obtain from it (as it becomes
obsolete or superseded by later discoveries and refinements).
Figure 1
Value as a Function of Latency
P+S

Figure 1 illustrates, in a highly stylized fashion, the
value (V(l)) derived from a particular scientific article by
publishers and society as a function of latency period (l).
Curve P represents the value function V(l) of publishers. If
the latency period is zero, the work will be freely copiable by
the public as soon as it is released, reducing the publisher’s
value from the work to zero. As l increases, however, the
publisher is able to sell subscriptions that include the work,
together with individual reprints, increasing V until a
plateau is reached at some maximal value. Conversely, curve
S represents the value function V(l) for society. Social welfare
is greatest if the work is freely accessible as soon as it is
released (l = 0), and decreases as the latency period increases.
At very long latency periods, social value approaches zero.
Curve P+S represents the sum of the values achieved by
Publishers and Society. The maximum of P+S is thus the
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value-maximizing latency period (lmax).
At this point,
publishers are likely to recoup sufficient costs and profit to
enable their ongoing operations, but are unlikely to agree to
allow l to decrease further. Also at this point, the work is also
sufficiently recent to enable society to make valuable use of it.
The model described in Figure 1 is easily extrapolated
from a single scientific article to the total supply of scientific
articles published by a particular publisher. In this case, P
would represent the aggregate value of the publisher’s works,
and S would represent the aggregate public benefit flowing
from such works. The latency period would be that applied to
each article and would result in a similar P+S curve
representing total value.
Likewise, a single valuemaximizing latency value lmax would emerge. I suggest that
the observed latency periods between six and twelve months
described above, each of which has been privately negotiated
in a different context, represent a convergence toward an
aggregate value-maximizing lmax for scientific publishing.216
In other words, these values may suggest an optimal latency
period for scientific publishing.
VI. TOWARD A PRIVATELY-ORDERED SOLUTION
If an optimal latency period does exist with respect to
scientific publishing, and if lmax indicates the appropriate
length of the exclusivity term that should be afforded to
scientific publications, then there are several potential
applications of this observation in addressing the market
inefficiencies caused by the serials crisis. One could point to
this period in arguing for a legislative reduction of the
copyright term for scientific journal articles.
Such a
legislative proposal might look similar to Shavell’s proposal to
abolish copyright in academic works altogether, but would

216. Not surprisingly, the publishing industry continues to take a public
position that one year is too short a period to recoup publishing costs. See The
Impact of the NIH Public Access Policy on Professional and Scholarly
Publishing, ASS ’ N OF A M . P UBLISHERS , http://www.publishers.org/issues/5/9/
(last visited Apr. 26, 2013) (“In the life sciences, on average, only 60% of an
article’s lifetime usage takes place in the first year of publication, leaving 40%
commercial value of an article lost when it is available free 12 months after
publication, [and] only 15% of the value of an article in American Psychological
Association (APA) journals is recouped after the first year of publication . . . .”).
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avoid some of the challenges of that proposal.217
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part II.B above, the tailoring of
intellectual property rights through legislative reform is
difficult and uncertain to achieve desired efficiency gains.
Likewise, the observed optimal latency period could be used
as a basis for further agency mandates, such as the expansion
of the NIH OA Policy to other agencies. But while the NIH
OA Policy has been a great success, as discussed in Part IV.B,
such policies are subject to political vagaries and cannot be
depended upon in the long run. Thus, I propose a latencybased private ordering approach to address the serials crisis
and attendant social welfare deficit.
A. The Role and Nature of Private Ordering
The term private ordering refers to rule systems that are
conceived, observed and often enforced by private actors
through extra-legal means. Since Robert Ellickson’s seminal
study of the unwritten code governing the behavior of
cattlemen and farmers in rural California,218 a large body of
scholarship has grown in this area. Commentators have
analyzed private ordering systems employed by groups
ranging from Hassidic diamond wholesalers,219 Memphis
cotton merchants,220 and Japanese organized crime
syndicates221 to the privately-chartered Internet domain name
authority ICANN,222 the New York Stock Exchange,223 and
217. Reducing copyright in scientific works to one year instead of eliminating
it altogether would enable publishers to recoup costs and continue to operate
without radically altering the financial model of the publishing industry (i.e., by
changing the entire industry from a reader-pays to an author-pays model), thus
avoiding the uncertainty and instability that such a change might bring.
218. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
219. Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
220. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1724 (2001).
221. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering:
An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
41 (2000).
222. James Boyle, Governance of the Internet: A Nondelegation Doctrine for
the Digital Age?, 50 DUKE L.J. 5 (2000).
223. Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium: Public and Private Ordering and The
Production Of Legitimate And Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
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modern credit rating agencies.224 While these communities
vary dramatically in their composition, goals, and patterns of
interaction, they share a single, notable trait: the substitution
of internally-administered rules for governmentally-imposed
rules.
In economic terms, private ordering solutions arise when
governmental allocations of rights have proven inefficient.
The Coase Theorem, as it has come to be known, holds that in
the absence of transaction costs, parties will bargain to the
same efficient outcomes regardless of the initial allocation of
rights.225 This reasoning has been used to argue that
uniformly broad intellectual property rights will not
necessarily lead to uniformity costs and diminished social
welfare, so long as parties are free to bargain to an efficient
outcome.226 Of course, it is generally acknowledged that
transaction costs in intellectual property transactions are
non-zero, and today, according to Carroll, “most agree that
difficulties in valuing patents and copyrights raise
transaction costs to the point that allocative efficiency will
depend upon the content of intellectual property
entitlements.”227 But even in the face of inefficient initial
allocations of intellectual property rights, private ordering
can play a role in reallocating resources to their most efficient
usage. As such, private ordering can serve as a robust
alternative to governmental tailoring of intellectual property
rights.228 In the following Sections, I will outline a private
ordering approach to scientific publishing that draws upon
the observed latency periods identified above.

1123, 1135 (1997).
224. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating
Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2002).
225. See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 67 (1997).
226. See Carroll, supra note 98, at 859.
227. Id. at 859 (citing Clarissa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial
Allocations Matter, 49 EMORY L.J. 823, 828–29 (2000)).
228. See Carroll, supra note 97, at 1393 (“[T]he theoretical advantages of
publicly tailored rights are minimized by tailoring through private ordering
supported by judicial and other public enforcement.”).
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B. The Problem of Collective Action
As described in Part V.A, various stakeholder groups
involved in scientific publishing have converged on a latency
period in the range of six to twelve months. Yet the adoption
of solutions based on this period has been fragmented, and
such solutions benefit only a fraction of the overall publishing
market.
Thus, the NIH OA Policy, perhaps the most
influential initiative to adopt a latency period, only affects
biomedical
literature
generated
by
NIH-funded
Voluntary OA policies implemented by
researchers.229
member-based societies only affect those journals and
members of those societies.230 And OA mandates adopted by
individual institutions only affect research generated by
researchers within those institutions.231 Thus, despite the
seeming trend toward the adoption of latency periods, the
benefits and burdens of this approach are spread unevenly
across the scientific community.232
Putting aside for the moment funder and governmental
OA mandates, which, as discussed above, may not be
sufficiently robust to suffice as long-term solutions to the
serials crisis, it is instructive to consider the position of a
hypothetical research institution, State U. Assume that the
administration of State U is both familiar with the serials
crisis and that State U has been affected by the crisis through
its own library’s cutbacks. Assume also that State U has
some number of faculty members whose research is funded by
non-NIH sources and who wish to submit articles to scientific
journals published by P, a commercial publisher. What
incentive does State U have to approach P to negotiate an
arrangement whereby its faculty publications would be
229. See supra Part IV.A.
230. See supra Part III.B.3.
231. See supra Part III.B.4.
232. For example, an NIH researcher at Harvard Medical School who
published a paper in the New England Journal of Medicine would, knowingly or
not, be participating in three separate instances of private ordering with respect
to the publication of that paper: through the NIH OA Policy, through NEJM’s
voluntary OA policy, and through Harvard’s OA mandate. On the other hand, a
psychology researcher at a small Midwestern college whose research was
funded by the American Psychiatric Association and who published his work in
Elsevier’s Cognitive Psychology would engage in none of these private ordering
solutions.
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released on an OA basis? Let us assume that State U already
has a subscription to P’s journals. The benefit of P’s OA
release of those articles would inure not to State U, but to
other institutions, such as City College, who choose not to
subscribe to P’s journals (either because they are unable to
afford them or because they choose to allocate their available
funds to different journals). Moreover, State U’s faculty
would likely perceive a risk from their university
administration attempting to negotiate an OA arrangement
with P, as those negotiations could be unsuccessful and
potentially result in P’s retaliation against State U faculty
members by rejecting their submissions. Based on these
considerations, State U has little incentive, individually, to
negotiate an OA arrangement with P and, in fact, faces a
disincentive in terms of the perceived risk incurred by its own
faculty. Thus, given the time, effort and legal expense
required to engage in such negotiations, and the fact that
such negotiations would need to be conducted not only with P,
but also with other publishers (Q, R, and S), it is not
surprising that State U will generally decline to engage in
such negotiations.233
The example of State U reveals the classic collective
action problem described by Mancur Olson in 1965:
[i]f the members of a large group rationally seek to
maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to
advance their common or group objectives unless there is
coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate
incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or
group interest, is offered to members of the group
individually on the condition that they help bear the costs
or burdens involved in the achievement of the group
objectives . . . . These points hold true even when there is
unanimous agreement in a group about the common good

233. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 67, at 402–03 (stating that in the
case of research materials (e.g., biological samples) and databases, universities
are most likely to act in their own self-interest, without regard to “the research
needs of the larger community.”).
The counter-example, of course, is H, a large and prestigious university that
engages in such negotiations out of a commitment to principle and with
sufficient confidence in its own bargaining position, and the indispensability of
its own faculty to the publishing enterprise, that it sees little risk in doing so.
See Priest, supra note 72, at 423–24.
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and the methods of achieving it.234

In effect, Olson’s insight is that individuals will not act to
achieve a common goal unless they have individual
incentives to do so, the achievement of the common good
being insufficient to motivate their action. This observation
is borne out by the relatively modest take-up of the open
access publishing models described in Part III. Accordingly,
for any private ordering solution to address the serials crisis
effectively, it must overcome this collective action barrier.
Two classic solutions to the collective action problem
involve state action and firm action.235 In the selection quoted
above, Olson himself recognizes the power of the state to
compel private actors to cooperate for the public good. This
solution, however, is not always palatable to the members of
the community and, as discussed above, is dependent on
political exigencies. Likewise, theories of firm action posit the
intervention of an entrepreneur who organizes and
compensates members of the community in pursuit of an
efficient result. Neither of these solutions has obvious
applicability to the collective action problem manifested by
the serials crisis.
Elinor Ostrom, however, poses a third alternative to
influencing collective action in the context of common
resources: the shaping of norms.236 As defined by Ostrom and
Sue Crawford, norms are “prescriptions held by an individual
that an action or outcome in a situation must, must not, or
may be permitted.”237 However, unlike formal rules, norms
are not backed by binding enforcement mechanisms.238 She
explains, first by recasting Olson, and then by introducing the
234. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION—PUBLIC GOODS
THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (2d ed. 1971). Olson summarizes the collective
action problem raised by self-interested action by group members. This problem
is distinct from the better-known collective action problem arising from
informational deficits among group members, as exemplified by the classic
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. See generally RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW 202 (1994).
235. These two approaches are summarized in ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING
THE COMMONS—THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 40–
41 (1990).
236. See ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 121
(2005).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 149–50.
AND THE
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possibility of changing the norms that otherwise would drive
group members toward their own self-interested, but less
socially-valuable, positions:
[t]his points to the importance of larger institutions that
enable participants in social dilemma situations to have
sufficient autonomy that they can change the rules that
affect their ongoing situations . . . . [M]any individuals
have crafted ingenious institutions that help them reach
mutually productive rather than mutually unproductive
outcomes.239

As discussed below, changing norms will play an
important role in addressing the collective action problem in
scientific publishing.
C. A Private Ordering Proposal: A One-Year Latency-Based
License
As discussed in Part I.C.1, copyright term is not the only
culprit behind the serials crisis. A related factor that has
enabled publishers to exert significant control over the
dissemination of scientific information is the transfer of
copyright by authors to publishers. The transfer of copyright,
by definition, gives a publisher the exclusive right to exploit a
work during its full copyright term. Assuming that copyright
term will remain at its current duration for the foreseeable
future, an author could seek to limit a publisher’s control over
the dissemination of a work by contractually limiting the
amount of time that the publisher has control over
dissemination of the work. Specifically, rather than assigning
the copyright in the work to the publisher, the author could
grant the publisher a license.
A license is simply a
contractual right to exercise one or more intellectual property
rights during a specified period of time.240 An appropriate
license to publish a scientific article might grant the
publisher the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute the
work during some period (e.g., the previously-identified one
year latency period), followed by a non-exclusive right to
reproduce and distribute the work during the remainder of

239. Id. at 132.
240. See generally Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act §
102(a)(41) (2001) (giving a definition of license).
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the copyright term.241
Such a publication license (which I term a Latency-Based
License) would provide the publisher with all necessary rights
to exploit the work (i.e., to reproduce and distribute it)
throughout the copyright term. In addition, during the
latency period, the publisher’s right would be exclusive,
meaning that neither the author nor any third party could
legally reproduce or distribute the work. Moreover, while the
license remained exclusive, the publisher would have the
right to enforce the copyright in the article against infringers
(unauthorized copiers).242 After the latency period, however,
though the publisher would retain a right to publish and
exploit the work, it would no longer have the exclusive right
to do so, nor to enforce the copyright against infringers.243
Accordingly, after the exclusivity period the author would
have the right to reproduce and distribute the work freely
and could, if he wished, grant this right to others with or
without compensation.
Such distribution could be
accomplished through Green OA self-archiving, a centralized
repository such as PubMed Central, or through a Gold open
access journal.
One important right restored to the author under the
Latency-Based License would be the right to disaggregate
article content for repurposing, excerption, aggregation,
annotation, searching, indexing, and other uses. Such rights
are becoming increasingly important as online tools grow in
sophistication. As recently observed by Jerry Reichman and
Ruth Okediji, “scientists increasingly rely on automated
knowledge discovery tools to mine and recombine vast
amounts of data and literature that are flowing at rates that
exceed the capacity of a single investigator to comprehend
241. A similar licensing proposal has been made in the Netherlands by the
SURF Foundation working with the U.K. Joint Information Systems Committee
(JISC).
See License to Publish (2006), available at http://www.surf.nl
/auteursrechten/en/landschap/relationships/authorpublisher/Pages/Licence-toPublish.aspx (proposing a six-month latency period).
242. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006) (conferring standing to sue on the “legal and
beneficial owner of an exclusive right under copyright”).
243. Publishers, of course, may own the copyright in the collective work
constituting a particular issue of a journal. See id. § 101 (defining collective
work to include periodical issues). However, in the Internet age, it is more
likely that individual articles, rather than traditional journal issues would be
the subject of most copying.
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and manage.”244
Yet many online journal articles are not full-text
searchable at all, and search engines are often limited to
indexing of abstracts and journal-identified keywords.245
Journals have been reluctant to permit full-text indexing of
articles and uploading of article text to semantic databases
that would enable sophisticated data mining.246 Instead,
researchers are often required to identify articles via abstract
searching, and then inefficiently scan or search articles
individually using desktop tools such as Adobe Acrobat
Reader.
Under the proposed Latency-Based License
approach, authors would have the right to authorize the
disaggregation of article content in order to facilitate
sophisticated searching and data mining following expiration
of the latency period.
A Latency-Based License approach would complement,
not replace, institutional and funder OA mandates. Though
the license would restore copyright control to the author after
the latency period, it would not require the author to make
his or her work publicly accessible.
This important
component of the open access equation must still be supplied
by institutions and funders that can impose such
requirements on individual researchers.247
While the use of a Latency-Based License by an
individual author when publishing a particular article would
244. Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, When Copyright Law and
Science Collide: Empowering Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a Global
Scale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1362, 1367 (2012).
245. The Wellcome Trust has reported that “87 per cent [sic] of the material
housed in UK’s main medical research database (UK Pub Med Central) is
unavailable for legal text and data mining.” IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL
OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH § 5.21
(2011); see also Reichman & Okediji, supra note 244, at 1425–26.
246. Michael Carroll speculates that publishers may deliberately limit such
rights in order to commercialize text mining capabilities on their own. Carroll,
supra note 151, at 3; see also Iain Hrynaszkiewicz & Matthew J. Cockerill, Open
by Default: A Proposed Copyright License and Waiver Agreement for Open
Access Research and Data in Peer-Reviewed Journals, 5 BMC RESEARCH NOTES
494, at 2 (2012) (proposing a form of license to overcome these impediments);
Richard Van Noorden, Text-Mining Spat Heats Up, 495 NATURE 295 (2013).
247. Such measures may also be needed to prod apathetic researchers to
make their works available after the expiration of the one-year latency period,
after they have moved on to other projects and have potentially forgotten about
previously-published but newly freed articles. (Thanks to Eric Priest for this
insight).
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ensure the free accessibility of that article, the goal of this
proposal is to effect a change more broadly within the
scientific publishing industry. Thus, I propose that research
institutions, as a group, adopt a standardized Latency-Based
License for use by researchers when publishing their
scientific articles. I propose that the latency period for this
standardized license be set, at least initially, at one year,
which reflects the negotiated (and possibly value-maximizing)
period observed in the scientific publishing industry. In the
weak version of this proposal, institutions would make this
template Latency-Based License available to their
researchers and encourage its use. In the strong version, use
of the Latency-Based License by researchers would be
mandated by institutions.248
D. Evaluating the Latency-Based License as a Tailoring
Solution
The Latency-Based License that I propose in Part VI.C
above is a privately-ordered means of tailoring publishers’
intellectual property rights in scientific literature that can
replace the publishing industry’s current copyright
assignment model. This proposal is intended to increase the
quantity of public scientific knowledge and thereby increase
net social welfare,249 without unduly burdening the
publishing industry or disrupting the production of scientific
literature. In analyzing this proposal, it is instructive to
consider its potential costs and benefits in terms of Carroll’s
248. Debate continues regarding the advisability of permitting researchers to
opt out of institutional open access mandates. One of the principal critiques of
Harvard-style mandates is that they permit faculty members to opt-out of OA
requirements with little inconvenience, thus encouraging authors to take the
path of least resistance, which often means acceding to whatever terms a
publisher offers in order to expedite the publication of one’s article. See Shavell,
supra note 86, at 332. The question of permitting opt-outs from a mandatory
Latency-Based License structure would need to be considered carefully during
the development of any template Latency-Based License.
249. The idea of a contractually-based commons is not new. See Peter Lee,
Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent
Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 917 (2009) (describing efforts by patient groups to use
contractual means to ensure access to patents); Michael J. Madison, Brett M.
Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural
Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010) (identifying various constructed
cultural commons); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 67 (arguing for a contractbased commons of scientific research data).
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three-part tailoring framework. On the basis of this analysis,
which is described below, I believe that the proposed LatencyBased License is likely to be effective in reducing uniformity
costs and increasing overall social welfare, introduces few
administrative hurdles and is politically feasible to
implement.250
1. Effectiveness
i.

As compared to assignment of copyright to the
publisher

If we acknowledge that copyright duration gives rise to
uniformity costs in the market for scientific publishing,251 we
must ask whether the proposed Latency-Based License is
likely to be effective in reducing this uniformity cost. One of
the primary differences between the proposed Latency-Based
License and the current regime in scientific publishing is the
limitation of publishers’ exclusive rights to a latency period of
one year, rather than the full copyright term (life of the
author plus seventy years). This one-year period was selected
based on the observations described in Part V.B above, which
supply the evidentiary basis for tailoring called for by
Carroll.252 Yet, such evidence alone is not sufficient to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the Latency-Based License
proposal. In analyzing it further, the effect of this proposal
on three principal constituencies (readers, authors and
publishers) must be considered.
250. It is possible that antitrust concerns may be raised with respect to the
collective action taken by institutions in developing and/or adopting an
industry-wide form of Latency-Based License. While a full analysis of these
issues is beyond the scope of this Article, I believe that such concerns would not
be justified, as the development of a non-binding industry-wide template
agreement would be unlikely to harm competition either among publishers or
research institutions, or to exert undue collective pressure on any cognizable
market. Cf. European Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 1) ¶ 301 (“As long as participation in the
actual establishment of standard terms is unrestricted for the competitors in
the relevant market (either by participation in the trade association or directly),
and the established standard terms are non-binding and effectively accessible
for anyone, such agreements are not likely to give rise to restrictive effects on
competition.”).
251. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
252. See Carroll, supra note 97, at 1399.
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It is relatively straightforward that the proposed
Latency-Based License, if broadly adopted, would increase
the quantity of scientific literature available to readers, as
distribution and publication of the literature could be
conducted freely after the expiration of the latency period.
Absent countervailing factors, social welfare measured by
reader access to knowledge would increase under the
proposed regime.
The impact of the proposed Latency-Based License on
authors and publishers is somewhat entwined. If publishers
have only one year of exclusivity in the articles that they
publish then, in order to continue to provide the services that
they currently provide,253 they will need to recoup their costs
plus a reasonable profit during this abbreviated exclusivity
period. Commercial publisher revenue today consists of three
principal components: subscriptions, reprints and advertising.
I will analyze these in turn.
The largest component of commercial scientific
publishing revenue is attributable to subscriptions (eightyfive percent according to Page, Campbell and Meadows254).
Even if articles become available on an OA basis one year
after initial publication, some percentage of researchers will
still demand access to articles as soon as they are published
and will be unwilling to wait to access them until after the
latency period.255 It is thus possible that the number of
subscribers will remain relatively close to their preadjustment values and publishers’ percentage drop-off in
subscription revenue will be relatively small. While more
empirical research is needed, support for this conclusion can
be found by examining the effect that the adoption of the
253. I assume that it is socially desirable for publishers’ intermediation
services to exist.
254. PAGE, CAMPBELL & MEADOWS , supra note 46, at 40.
255. There are many reasons why researchers would not wish to wait until
the expiration of a latency period to access articles, particularly those that are
closely related to their own research. The two most prominent reasons for this
impatience are the need for researchers to cite the most current literature in
their own papers and in grant applications. In each case, it would be
embarrassing at best for a peer reviewer to identify recent literature of which
the author/applicant is unaware. Most importantly, such an omission could
signal to reviewers that the author/applicant is not fully conversant with the
literature in the field, a damning conclusion that could lead either to rejection of
an article or a critical deduction from a grant application score.
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mandatory NIH OA Policy has had on subscriptions for
biomedical literature.256 Existing data indicate that the
largest commercial publishers of biomedical journals suffered
no noticeable drop-off in subscription revenue in the two
years immediately following NIH’s adoption of its mandatory
OA policy.257 In fact, the revenue of the two largest scientific
publishers in the medical field, Elsevier and Wolters Kluwer,
Thus, while
increased slightly from 2008 to 2009.258
publishers may see some drop-off of subscription revenue
from institutions who value particular publications at the
margin, it is likely that subscription revenue will remain
relatively stable under a publishing agreement incorporating
a latency period of one year.259
Advertising rates are typically tied to a journal’s
subscription base. To the extent that journal subscriptions do
not drop significantly as a result of the public release of
articles after the latency period, one would not expect to see a
significant drop in advertising revenue.
The most significant area in which journals are likely to
see revenue reductions stemming from post-exclusivity open
access is reprints. As noted in Part I.B.2, publishers earn
reprint revenue both from traditional print reprints
(additional glossy copies of articles that authors have
traditionally sent to colleagues) and, more importantly today,
one-time access charges for online versions of articles. Once
an article becomes publicly-available, it is unlikely that a
non-subscribing researcher who needs access to the article
will pay the journal for it. Thus, a publisher will only have
the opportunity to earn reprint revenue from articles during
the latency period. Assuming that the useful life of an article
is longer than one year, and that demand for copies of the
article will continue for some years following the expiration of
the latency period, some loss of reprint revenue would be
expected and the percentage by which publisher reprint
256. The NIH OA Policy requires that all articles based on research funded
by NIH must be deposited into NIH’s publicly-accessible PubMed Central
repository within one year following initial publication. See supra Part IV.A.
257. See Dorsey et al., supra note 47, at fig.2.
258. Id.
259. Likewise, in each of the other cases cited, see supra Part V.B, in which a
latency period has been observed, I am unaware of any reported impact on
publisher revenue or profit.
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revenue drops following a shift to an early-release model is
likely to be relatively high.
However, because reprint
revenue represents only a small percentage of overall journal
revenue (eight percent according to Page, Campbell and
Meadows260), even a steep decline in reprint revenue would
not have a great impact on overall journal revenue.
Based on this analysis, it is likely that commercial
publishers faced with a regime in which they enjoy exclusive
rights to publish articles for only one year would not suffer
significant declines in subscription or advertising revenue,
and any reduction in reprint revenue would amount to a
small percentage of the whole. Thus, it is reasonable to
conclude that such a shift would allow journals to continue to
recoup their costs plus a reasonable profit. This conclusion is
borne out by the observed convergence of the industry in
independent negotiations on such a latency period.
If
publishers do not experience significant financial distress
from this shift and thus maintain current publishing models,
authors are also unlikely to reduce their output of research
articles.
Thus, the proposed shift from a copyright assignment
regime to a more limited Latency-Based License regime is
likely to produce net social welfare gains: public access to
scientific literature will increase, publishers will experience
minor losses of reprint revenue but will otherwise maintain
near-current levels of revenue and profitability, and author
output of articles is unlikely to change.
ii. As compared to a zero-copyright regime
In assessing the proposed intellectual property tailoring
solution, it is also useful to compare its likely efficiency gains
with those of Shavell’s copyright abolition proposal. As
discussed in Part II, abolishing copyright in academic works
would make those works available to the public immediately,
thus enhancing social welfare from the outset, whereas the
proposed Latency-Based License would not result in the
release of works until the expiration of the latency period,
yielding a deferred social welfare gain.261 Thus, viewing only
260. PAGE, CAMPBELL & MEADOWS , supra note 46, at 40.
261. I have previously argued that delaying the addition of knowledge to an
information commons diminishes the total quantity of knowledge within the
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the effect on readers, the Shavell proposal appears to result
in greater welfare gains. However, as discussed in Part II,
abolishing academic copyright would push the publishing
market toward an author-pays model with unpredictable
consequences for authors. If author charges were raised high
enough, the production of academic works could be
diminished, resulting in a social welfare deficit. Thus, it is
unclear whether an abolition approach would yield a net
social benefit or cost, whereas it is likely that the proposed
Latency-Based License would yield a net social benefit.
Moreover, the proposed Latency-Based License has the
virtue of preserving stability in the market and would not
result in a significant disruption of existing market roles or
dynamics. A broad market shift from a reader-pays to an
author-pays model, however, has never been attempted, and
the results are unpredictable.
While some element of
uncertainty is inherent in any proposal for legal change,
assuming other factors are equal, the preferable approach is
often the one that introduces less volatility to the market.
iii. As compared to existing OA models
As noted above, the Latency-Based License would restore
to the author rights in his or her work following the
expiration of the latency period. At that time, the author
would be free to distribute the work via a Green OA selfarchiving platform or via other means. Proponents of Green
OA might ask why the Latency-Based License is preferable to
approaches such as the SPARC Addendum, which are
currently in use and already reserve to the author the right to
self-archive his or her work. There are several important
differences between current Green OA approaches and the
Latency-Based License. First, the Latency-Based License
does more than reserve a non-exclusive self-archiving right to
the author; it restores to the author full copyright ownership,
with all concomitant rights including the right to enable
disaggregation and searching of content. Second, upon the
restoration of these rights, the author has the ability to
commons at a given point in time, making its contents less valuable than they
would have been absent such delay. See Contreras, supra note 175, at 1632.
However, this tradeoff may be justified to achieve policy compromises that
enable the creation of the commons in the first place.
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distribute the final, published version of his or her work, not
a less citable pre-print or post-print version. Finally, the
Latency-Based License approach creates a framework for
establishing a uniform latency period across the entire
industry, eliminating the effects of disparities in institutional
negotiating power.
The proposed Latency-Based License also has advantages
over existing Gold OA models, as it would enable the current
publishing infrastructure to continue to operate without a
radical (and unpredictable) shift in publishing economics.
2. Administrability
The second prong of Carroll’s tailoring framework
requires an assessment of the ease and cost of administering
the proposed Latency-Based License proposal. The LatencyBased License is a contractual private ordering solution that
does not depend on the amendment or enactment of laws,
rules, or regulations. As such, it has both strengths and
weaknesses as compared to a legislative solution. The most
notable benefit of a legislative solution over a private
ordering solution is that the former automatically applies to
all parties within the jurisdiction, whereas the latter must be
implemented party-by-party on a piecemeal basis. It is for
this reason that Carroll suggests that in some cases, private
ordering may viewed as less efficient, or more costly, than the
establishment of broadly-applicable rules.262 However, this
inefficiency occurs when multiple individual parties are
required to bargain separately with each other to achieve the
desired result, thereby increasing overall transaction costs.
The proposed Latency-Based License is intended to remain
uniform across all transactions (other than in the details of
the specific work, author and journal). Thus, the aggregate
effect of multiple licenses between institutions and publishers
more closely resembles that of a broadly-applicable rule than
a multiplicity of individual transactions. For this reason it is
generally acknowledged that the use of standardized
262. See Carroll, supra note 97, at 1399 (“[T]o the extent that transaction
costs limit the scope of effective private ordering, some progress toward the
theoretical ideal of tailored rights can be made when rights are defined as
formally uniform while incorporating features that yield differential results in
how the rights actually function.”).
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contracting forms is both an efficient and effective means of
Thus,
establishing relationships between parties.263
individual and aggregate transaction costs under the
proposed Latency-Based License regime should not be any
greater than they are under the copyright assignment regime
in place today, and would likely be less (as publisher
assignment agreements are not themselves uniform and thus
require legal resources to review and interpret).
In fact, the very need for legislation to be generally
applicable highlights a significant advantage of the LatencyBased License over the abolition of academic copyright.
While the legislative proposal would require Congress to
define, and courts to interpret, new categories of material
exempt from copyright protection (with the attendant linedrawing difficulties noted above),264 each Latency-Based
License would apply unambiguously to a particular scientific
article. There would be little doubt when or how to apply the
license to the work, as there could be if the work were instead
subject to a broad statutory exclusion. And although disputes
will invariably arise between contracting parties, courts are
accustomed to engaging in contractual interpretation. In
contrast, courts interpreting a new statutory exception have
no direct precedent to guide them. Thus, unburdened by the
administrative and interpretive difficulties that would
necessarily attend the abolition of academic copyright, the
proposed Latency-Based License would be highly
administrable.
3. Political Economy
Unlike the proposal to abolish copyright in academic
works, the private ordering solution proposed in this Article
would require little political or legislative action. As such, its
implementation is far more feasible from a political economy
standpoint than the copyright abolition proposal, and even
than efforts to expand agency mandates beyond the NIH OA
263. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 362–63 (1960) (“The content of the standardized terms accumulates
experience, it avoids or reduces legal risks and also confers all kinds of
operating leeways and advantages, all without need of either consulting counsel
from instance to instance or of bargaining with the other parties.”).
264. See supra Part II.B.2.
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Policy.
E. Collective Action and Changing Norms
In order to effectuate a wholesale change in the market
for scientific literature and thereby reverse the impact of the
serials crisis, a substantial number of research institutions
would need to endorse and adopt the proposed Latency-Based
License. Yet, as discussed in Part VI.B, there has historically
been little incentive for individual research institutions to
negotiate with publishers over access to published articles.
Such negotiations are perceived to be time-consuming,
resource-intensive, and potentially prejudicial to the interests
of researchers at those institutions. Thus, despite the general
social welfare gains that could be achieved through broad
adoption and use of the Latency-Based License, a collective
action problem must be overcome for such an approach to be
successful.
Responding to the collective action dilemma articulated
by Olson, Ostrom suggests that the shifting of group norms
may foster collective action.265 But how does one go about
changing norms in the face of the resistance noted above?
Below is a suggested approach to developing and
implementing the proposed Latency-Based License regime in
scientific publishing that takes these measures into account.
1. Drafting a Consensus-Based License
The first step in fostering the adoption of a LatencyBased License will be the development of a broadly-accepted
model agreement template. Such a template could then be
used by all research institutions and publishers without the
investment of significant legal or managerial resources. A
major advantage of using an industry-wide agreement
template is that it gives all market participants equal
information about major terms and sets expectations
accordingly. Thus, with the bilateral university-publisher
agreements described in Part III.B.4 above, institutions lack
information regarding the terms negotiated with publishers
by peer institutions, and each institution is left to negotiate in
an informational vacuum. With a standardized template
265. See supra notes 236–237 and accompanying text.
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agreement, each institution begins from the same base of
knowledge and can be assured that the terms offered are
consistent and reasonable.
Industry-specific template agreements have been adopted
successfully in a number of different fields from online
advertising266 to residential real estate purchases.267 In
addition, cross-industry agreements, most notably the
Creative Commons suite of content licenses,268 have gained
widespread acceptance. The licensing of a scientific article to
a publisher is a relatively straightforward legal transaction,
and there is no technical reason that a template agreement
could not be developed for this purpose.
A key element in the development of a successful
template agreement is participation by a broad cross-section
of the industry. Broad participation both invests multiple
participants in the success of the enterprise and makes it
more likely that they will themselves be leaders in adopting
the resulting product. Though it may seem counter-intuitive,
not only researchers but publishers should be invited to
participate in the development of the Latency-Based License
template. Such participation will mute later complaints of
process bias and unfairness, and will enable publishers to
voice legitimate concerns regarding the terms to which they
will be expected to accede. Even if publishers do not
meaningfully participate in the drafting, they will be less
likely to raise claims of exclusion if they are invited to do so.
And though large commercial publishers may be resistant to
changing the industry’s current intellectual property regime,
it is possible that a Latency-Based License approach may
gain support among association and learned society
publishers, thus weakening objections that may later be
266. See Standard Terms and Conditions for Internet Advertising for
Media Buys One Year or Less Version 3.0, I NTERACTIVE ADVERTISING
BUREAU (Dec. 2009), http://www.iab.net/guidelines/508676/tscs3.
267. See, e.g., CAL. ASS’N REALTORS, San Francisco Purchase Agreement and
Joint Escrow Instructions (2011), available at http://www.car.org/media/pdf
/legal/standard-forms/507939/.
268. See
About
the
Licenses,
CREATIVE
COMMONS,
www.creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2013); see also
Hrynaszkiewicz & Cockerill, supra note 246 (proposing the use of the Creative
Commons CC0 license for published scientific data). See generally Michael W.
Carroll, Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV.
45 (2006).
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raised by commercial publishers.
The process of drafting and agreeing upon a template
agreement can take months or years, and is best organized by
a neutral body that commands some level of respect in the
field.
For example, a committee of the American Bar
Association (ABA) acted as the convenor in drafting the
Model Trading Partner Agreement for Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI).269 With respect to a template LatencyBased License for scientific publishing, various potential
conveners come to mind, including the ABA, open licensing
groups such as Creative Commons, broad-based scientific
associations such as the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS), and archive-focused
organizations such as the Scholarly Publishing and Academic
Resources Coalition (SPARC).
One important strategic decision that the project
organizers must make is whether one or more governmental
agencies or non-profit funders should be involved in the
drafting effort. Obvious candidates would include NIH and
the Wellcome Trust, both of which have been active in
advocating for greater open access to the scientific literature.
While, the involvement of a large funder would probably
command greater attention from the industry, such
involvement would also have the potential to politicize the
drafting process. Thus, the advantages and drawbacks of
involving a large funder in this activity should be weighed
carefully.
2. Achieving Adoption—Nudging Norms
Once a template Latency-Based License template has
been developed and approved by the drafting group, it can be
rolled out for use by researchers submitting articles to
journals. In order to realize the potential efficiency gains of
such an approach, the use of the Latency-Based License
template must be adopted by a broad segment of the scientific
community and used in place of publishers’ current copyright
assignments. In effect, the basic legal model for scientific
269. See JANE KAUFMAN WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 5–62 (2004); Electronic Messaging Services Task
Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange—A Report and
Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 BUS. LAWYER 1645 (1990).

3_CONTRERAS FINAL.DOC

568

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

7/23/2013 9:25 PM

[Vol. 53

publishing, and the assumptions underlying that model, must
change. Changing long-held assumptions and practices, of
course, is not easy, but below are a few suggested approaches.
i.

Following the Leader

A handful of large research institutions have already
shown strong public support for open access initiatives from
self-archiving to their own institutional mandates.270 It is
likely that these leader institutions would also represent the
first wave to adopt the proposed Latency-Based License.
However, it may not be obvious to smaller or less researchfocused institution that such an approach will be fruitful or
worth the effort for them. Moreover, researchers at smaller
institutions are likely to be more susceptible to fears of
retaliation by publishers, and thus less inclined to use the
new template unless required to do so.
Thus, leader
institutions should offer support and advice to other
institutions regarding administrative steps that can be taken
to adopt the new approach as smoothly as possible. Their
example can also demonstrate that immediate publisher
reprisals will not necessarily flow from use of the new
model.271 Once leader institutions have begun the process of
shifting to the new intellectual property model, norms will
already have begun to shift in this area.
ii. Following the Money
Though the proposed shift to a Latency-Based License
does not require direct action by governmental or non-profit
funders of scientific research, funders can lend significant
support to this effort. Such support can come in two forms:
general public endorsements by high-ranking agency officials,
and express acknowledgements that use of a Latency-Based
License would either be acceptable or preferred when
complying with funder OA mandates. For example, NIH
could encourage the use of a Latency-Based License in lieu of
the limited publisher submission to PubMed Central that

270. See supra Parts III.B.1, III.B.4.
271. I am aware of no evidence that Harvard, M.I.T. or other large research
institutions have been disadvantaged by publishers as a result of their existing
open access mandates.
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currently occurs.272 At some point, if the Latency-Based
License achieved significant adoption, NIH could even specify
its use in satisfying the requirements of the NIH OA
mandate.
iii. Emphasizing (Individual) Efficiencies
Absent coercion, individual actors are most likely to be
persuaded to act to achieve a public goal if they receive an
individual incentive for doing so. Under the theory of the
firm strategy, an entrepreneurial organizer will compensate
individual group members to entice them to work toward an
Absent direct
efficiency-enhancing public goal.273
compensation, individual members of the group must be
persuaded that it is in their individual self-interest to work
toward the public goal.
In the case of shifting the scientific publishing market
toward use of a uniform Latency-Based License template,
such individual incentives do exist.
These include the
reduction of both transaction costs and transactional
uncertainty. Currently, every scientific publisher uses a
similar, but slightly different, set of legal instruments to
acquire the copyright in articles that it agrees to publish. In
the first instance, these legal instruments are provided to
researchers at some point during the publication process.
Most scientists lack the legal training to understand either
the language or the legal ramifications of the documents that
they are asked to sign. Upon receiving these documents,
researchers are thus presented with two imperfect options:
either sign the documents and hope for the best, or refer them
to the institution’s legal counsel for review. The first option
could result in unintended negative consequences, as the
documents are drafted by the publisher and likely to take
positions as favorable to the publisher’s interests as possible.
The second option would add time (a drawback form the
researcher’s standpoint) and cost (a drawback from the
institution’s standpoint). Even worse, the reviewing legal
counsel might recommend (or require) that the publisher’s
agreement be amended in some way before execution, leading
272. See supra Part IV.B.2.
273. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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to the researcher’s expenditure of more time and effort and,
worse still, the publisher’s possible withdrawal of the
publication offer.
The use of a uniform template Latency-Based License
would reduce each of these costs dramatically.
First,
transactional uncertainty would be avoided, as the template
agreement would be uniform across all publication
transactions and its effect would be well-understood by
institutional counsel. An institution could thus advise its
researchers to sign any Latency-Based License that
conformed to the approved template without further legal
review. Second, transaction costs would be reduced, as the
need for legal review of publication agreements would be
more limited once all transactions were conducted using the
standardized template agreement.274
3. Precedents in Law and Licensing
While the copyright assignment model currently
employed by the scientific publishing industry has been in
place for decades, the use of this model is not standard
throughout the larger publishing industry. For example,
trade book publishers typically seek only a license to publish
a book, though this license may be exclusive with respect to
certain markets, geographies or formats (e.g., hardcover,
paperback, audiobook, digital download, etc.).275 Thus, there
is no magic to the scientific publishing industry’s legal
approach: it is simply the product of industry custom and
usage, and can be changed.
While it is true that bringing about new norms of
interaction could initially meet resistance, there are
numerous precedents suggesting that such a shift in the
scientific publishing market is not beyond reach.
As
discussed in Part III.B.1, many universities already
274. Efficiency gains from the use of standardize contracts have been
recognized for some time. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
211 cmt. a (1981) (“Standardization of agreements serves many of the same
functions as standardization of goods and services; both are essential to a
system of mass production and distribution. Scarce and costly time and skill
can be devoted to a class of transactions rather than the details of individual
transactions.”).
275. See, e.g., Gloria C. Phares, Copyright Licensing, in ADVANCED SEMINAR
ON COPYRIGHT LAW 29, 319 (2008).
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encourage their faculty to utilize the SPARC Addendum or a
similar document to reserve self-archiving rights for
published articles, and many publishers have honored such
requests.276 Similarly, in 2007 a group of major research
universities and associations adopted a document entitled
Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology.277
The Nine Points document responded to growing concerns
over the commercial influence on university technology
transfer practices and contained recommendations to
university licensing officers regarding the retention of
teaching and research rights, ensuring broad access to
research tools and meeting the needs of neglected
populations.278 Since its release, nearly 100 institutions
worldwide have formally adopted the Nine Points document,
and it has become a standard fixture in the discussion of
university technology licensing.279
Even more relevant is the experience in academic legal
publishing. In the past, academic legal journals (law reviews)
required that authors assign copyright to them, much as
scientific journals do today.280 However, beginning in the
early 1990s, a small number of law professors began to object
to this practice.281 The number of dissenters grew, and in
1996 the American Association of Law Schools (AALS)
appointed a Special Committee to develop a model publication
agreement for law reviews.282 The committee’s work resulted
276. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
277. In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University
Technology (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://www.autm.net/Nine_Points_to_
Consider1.htm.
278. See Elia Powers, 9 (Suggested) Commandments of Research Licensing,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 7, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com
/news/2007/03/07/tech.
279. See Endorse the Nine Points to Consider, ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH.
MANAGERS, https://www.autm.net/source/NinePoints/ninepoints_endorsement
.cfm (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) (listing ninety-nine signatories to the Nine
Points document).
280. See generally Michael W. Carroll, The Movement for Open Access Law,
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741, 754 (2006); Benjamin J. Keele, Copyright
Provisions in Law Journal Publication Agreements, 102 L. LIBR. J. 269 (2010).
281. Author's informal discussions with Professor Mark A. Lemley, Professor
of Law, Stanford Univ., Dir. of Stanford Univ. Program in Law, Sci. & Tech..
282. Memorandum 98-24 from Bari Burke to Deans of Member and Fee-Paid
Schools (May 18, 1998), available at http://www.aals.org/deansmemos/9824.html#1.

3_CONTRERAS FINAL.DOC

572

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

7/23/2013 9:25 PM

[Vol. 53

in a model Author/Journal Agreement (AJA) that was
released in 1998. The AJA grants the publishing law review
a one-year exclusive license to publish an article and allows
the author to retain ownership of the copyright.283 Other
legal academics, including Mark Lemley of Stanford Law
School, developed their own forms of non-assignment
publication licenses.284 In 2005, Professors Michael Carroll
and Dan Hunter initiated the Science Commons Open Access
Law Program, which also developed an Open Access Model
Publishing Agreement and promoted limited-duration
In 2008, the
exclusivity for law review publishing.285
directors of the libraries of twelve major U.S. law schools met
in Durham, North Carolina and adopted the Durham
Statement on Open Access to Legal Scholarship.286 Among
other things, the Durham Statement “urge[d] faculty
members to reserve their copyrights to ensure that they . . .
can make their own scholarship available in stable, open,
digital formats.”287 The Durham signatories recommended
that the AALS model publishing agreement be used to
achieve this end.
These efforts have had a significant impact on the legal
publishing market. According to one study, by 2009 only
twenty-two percent of law reviews requested an assignment
of copyright.288 Thirty-three percent requested an exclusive
license, most of which were time-limited, and forty-five
percent only requested a non-exclusive license.289 According
to this study, many law review publishing agreements
resembled either the AALS or Science Commons model
agreements, further indicating the influence of the law
professors’ efforts over industry practices.290

283. Id.
284. Discussions with Mark A. Lemley, supra note 281.
285. See Carroll, supra note 280, at 754–55; Open Access Law Program,
S CIENCE COMMONS , http://sciencecommons.org/projects/publishing/oalaw/ (last
visited May 3, 2013).
286. Durham Statement on Open Access to Legal Scholarship, available
at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/durhamstatement (last updated
Feb. 1, 2012).
287. Id.
288. Keele, supra note 280, at 274.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 276.

3_CONTRERAS FINAL.DOC

2013]

7/23/2013 9:25 PM

THE CRISIS IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING

573

The experiences described above suggest that norms
pertaining to the terms of legal agreements, and academic
publishing agreements in particular, can be changed with
effort and determination. Thus, just as legal academia has
effected a significant shift in the law review publication
market, it is possible that scientific publishers may be
persuaded to adopt new norms of publishing that are more
responsive to the needs of the scientific community.291 To this
end, the recent mathematicians’ boycott of Elsevier292 has
demonstrated that even the largest publishers will respond to
their customers (and content providers) when they demand it.
F. Broader Implications—Latency Beyond Science
While it is the primary aspiration of this Article to offer a
proposal to address the serials crisis in scientific publishing, I
also hope that the methodology and general approach
presented herein may have some applicability to fields beyond
the sciences that are subject to similar intellectual property
uniformity costs. Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg
identify several fields in which commons of intangible assets
have been created.293 One of these is garage band music.
Musical compositions are protected by copyright in much the
same way as scientific publications.
Despite outward
appearances, there are a number of similarities between the
structures of the music industry and the scientific publishing
industry: both involve the creation of works by a large
number of disaggregated producers, both are dominated by
intermediaries (music publishers/record labels and journal
publishers) that obtain exclusive rights to distribute those
works, both sets of intermediaries have traditionally
performed selection, quality-control and distribution
functions, and both industries are undergoing radical change
due to the advent of digital technologies. It could also be
argued that the long duration of copyright and the near291. I recognize, of course, the significant differences between the legal and
scientific publishing industries, including the fact that most law reviews are
student edited publications that are financially supported by law schools, rather
than stand-alone commercial publishing enterprises. Nevertheless, I believe
that the shift in norms at law reviews is, at the very least, informative to the
discussion of scientific publishing.
292. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
293. Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 249, at 657, 663.
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absolute control over musical content exercised by music
publishers/record labels creates social welfare losses and
lessens content production: uniformity costs in a different
guise.
It is possible that the lessons learned, and the
approaches adopted, in the scientific publishing industry
could be relevant to the far larger market for music. Could
private ordering solutions—new forms of limited-duration,
latency-based music publishing agreements or recording
contracts—yield welfare-enhancing results? A full analysis of
private ordering arrangements within the music industry
remains to be conducted along the lines that I have outlined
here, but it would not be surprising if such an analysis
revealed the emergence of latency periods in certain
contexts.294 And the need for alternate models of allocating
rights will only become more important as composers
increasingly seek to build on prior work through sampling,
remixing and mashing, much as scientists build upon the
work of their predecessors.295
CONCLUSION
The serials crisis in scientific publishing can be traced to
the long duration of copyright protection and the assignment
of copyright by researchers to publishers. Over-protection of
scientific literature has enabled commercial publishers to
increase subscription rates to a point at which access to
294. Eric Priest offers one possible example from the music industry in
China. In China, free copies of most songs become available on file sharing sites
soon after they are released, and are readily located and downloaded for free
with the aid of major search engines like Baidu and Yahoo.cn. See Will Digital
Music in China Overthrow the Traditional Music Publishing Business?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 10, 2006), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn
.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1469. Record labels have been relatively unsuccessful
in enforcing their copyrights in pirated songs. Id. Thus, it is reported that at
least one major domestic Chinese music label reached an agreement with Baidu
and Yahoo.cn whereby, for the first two weeks following a new release, during
which labels make a large portion of their revenue from the song, search results
for the song would be limited to links to the record label's official site. Id. In
exchange, presumably, the label would relax its enforcement efforts against the
search engines. In this highly dynamic market, two weeks may be an optimal
latency period.
295. See, e.g., KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE—THE
LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 162–86 (2011) (describing significant
market failures in the digital sampling of music).
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scientific information has been curtailed with negative social
welfare consequences. The uniformity costs imposed by such
over-protection can be addressed by tailoring intellectual
property rights, either through legal change or private
ordering.
Current open access channels of distribution offer
alternative approaches to scientific publishing, but neither
the Green OA self-archiving nor the Gold OA author-pays
models has yet achieved widespread acceptance. Moreover,
recent proposals to abolish copyright protection for academic
works, while theoretically attractive, may be difficult to
implement in view of current legislative and judicial
inclinations. Likewise, funder open access mandates such as
the NIH OA Policy, though responsible for the public release
of millions of scientific articles, suffer from various risks and
political uncertainty.
In this Article, I propose an alternative private ordering
solution based on latency values observed in open access
stakeholder negotiation settings.
Under this proposal,
research institutions would collectively develop and adopt
publication agreements that do not transfer copyright
ownership to publishers, but instead grant publishers a
twelve-month exclusive period in which to publish a work.
This limited period of exclusivity should enable the publisher
to recoup its publishing costs and a reasonable profit through
subscription revenues, while restoring control of the article
copyright to the author at the end of the exclusivity period.
This approach would also complement and facilitate
compliance with existing institutional and funder open access
mandates. The balanced approach proposed in this Article
addresses the needs of both publishers and the scientific
community, and would, I believe, avoid many of the
challenges faced by existing open access models.

